Arbitration Conflicts by Noll, David L.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2018
Arbitration Conflicts
David L. Noll
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Noll, David L., "Arbitration Conflicts" (2018). Minnesota Law Review. 64.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/64
  
 
665 
Article 
Arbitration Conflicts 
David L. Noll† 
Introduction  ............................................................................ 666 
I. The Interpretive Problem .................................................... 674 
A. The Rise of Arbitration Conflicts  ............................... 674 
1. The Arbitration Revolution  ................................... 674 
2. The Agency Response  ............................................. 683 
3. The Attack on Agency Regulation  ......................... 686 
B. Authority to Regulate Arbitration as a Problem of 
Statutory Interpretation  ............................................ 690 
II. The FAA as Baseline  ........................................................ 692 
A. Floor or Ceiling?  ......................................................... 694 
B. Does the FAA Occupy a Special Position in  
Federal Law?  .............................................................. 698 
1. Textual Silence  ....................................................... 699 
2. Arguments from Arbitrability Jurisprudence ....... 701 
3. The FAA as “Super-Statute”  .................................. 703 
III. The Effect of Other Laws  ................................................. 707 
A. Express Qualifications  ............................................... 708 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; david.noll@rut-
gers.edu. This Article is part of a larger project examining arbitration’s impli-
cations for public law and regulation. See also David L. Noll, Deregulating Ar-
bitration, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 51 (2017); David L. Noll, Regulating 
Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985 (2017); David L. Noll, The CFPB’s Arbitra-
tion Rule: The Road Ahead, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NYU 69TH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND CON-
SUMER DISPUTES (2018). In undertaking that project, I have benefitted from 
presentations at the Association of American Law Schools’ 2017 ADR Works-in-
Progress Workshop at Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, the Chapman Law 
School Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress Conference, the Civil Procedure 
Workshop at Seattle University School of Law, the Quinnipiac-Yale Dispute 
Resolution Workshop, and the Rutgers faculty colloquium. Many thanks to par-
ticipants at those events and to Pamela Bookman, Jessica Clarke, Zachary Clop-
ton, Bethany Davis Noll, Jay Feinman, David Horton, Alyssa King, Henry 
Noyes, the late Ronald Rotunda, Jean Sternlight, and Adam Zimmerman for 
valuable feedback and criticism. Karina Delgado, Jacob Shulman, and Richard 
Wille provided crucial research assistance. Copyright © 2018 by David L. Noll. 
  
666 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:665 
 
1. Statutes Expressly Addressing the Validity, 
Enforceability, or Revocability of Agreements  
to Arbitrate  ............................................................. 708 
2. Statutes that Delegate Authority to Regulate 
Arbitration to an Administrative Agency  ............. 709 
3. The Relevance of Statutes that Expressly  
Modify the FAA  ...................................................... 711 
B. Implied Qualifications  ................................................ 713 
1. Statutes Governing Primary Conduct  ................... 714 
2. Litigation-Structuring Statutes  ............................ 719 
3. Statutes that Subject Regulated Parties’  
Contracting to Agency Oversight  .......................... 721 
4. Statutes that Delegate Authority to an Agency to 
Promulgate Subsidiary Administrative Policy  ..... 724 
IV. Laws that Do Not Qualify the FAA: Chevron and Agency 
Arbitration Regulation  ..................................................... 729 
A. The Chevron Decision  ................................................. 729 
B. Chevron’s Limits  ......................................................... 733 
C. Chevron-Type Statutes as Authority for Agency 
Arbitration Regulation  ............................................... 734 
Conclusion  ............................................................................... 738 
Appendix A  .............................................................................. 740 
Post-2007 Arbitration Statutes  ........................................ 740 
Appendix B  .............................................................................. 743 
Agency Arbitration Regulation Since 2007  ..................... 743 
Appendix C  .............................................................................. 747 
Historical Agency Arbitration Regulation  ....................... 747 
  INTRODUCTION   
On the first day of the Supreme Court’s 2017 term, the Court 
heard argument in a case that affected the rights of some 60 mil-
lion American workers.1 At issue in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 
was the lawfulness of an individual employment agreement that 
required all employment-related disputes to be resolved in one-
on-one arbitration and foreclosed access to any form of collective 
dispute resolution.2 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides 
that covered arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and 
 
 1. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. 
Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“[A]pproximately 55 percent of non-union private 
employees have contracts that are covered by mandatory arbitration agree-
ments, and that covers about 60 million people.”). 
 2. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1619–21. 
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enforceable”3 and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
requiring arbitration agreements to be enforced “according to 
their terms.”4 But the Norris-LaGuardia Act and National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) guarantee workers’ right to engage in 
“concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”5 And the NLRA has long been 
interpreted by courts and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) to protect workers’ right to seek legal remedies as a 
group6 and to prohibit employers from demanding that employ-
ees waive the NLRA’s protections in individual employment 
agreements.7 Under the FAA, the agreement in Epic Systems 
 
 3. U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub L. No. 68-401, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codi-
fied at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Arbitration 
Act, FAA, or Act). 
 4. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1612; see, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship 
v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017) (“By its terms . . . the Act cares not only 
about the ‘enforce[ment]’ of arbitration agreements, but also about their initial 
‘valid[ity]’—that is, about what it takes to enter into them.”); Volt Info. Scis., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) 
(“There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural 
rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their 
terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”). 
 5. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees 
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection. . .”); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 
(2012) (recognizing the public policy of the United States that the individual 
worker “be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of la-
bor . . . in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”). 
 6. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978) (dictum) (“[I]t 
has been held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects employees from 
retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions 
through resort to administrative and judicial forums, and that employees’ ap-
peals to legislators to protect their interests as employees are within the scope 
of this clause.”); see, e.g., Harco Trucking, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 478, 478–79 (2005) 
(filing a wage and hour class action on behalf of similarly situated employees); 
Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948–49 (1942) (filing of consoli-
dated Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims concerted activity); Poultry-
men’s Serv. Corp., 41 N.L.R.B. 444, 460–61, n.28 (1942) (filing of FLSA suit on 
behalf of employee and others similarly situated), enforced, 138 F.2d 204 (3d 
Cir. 1943). 
 7. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (“Wherever 
private contracts conflict with [the NLRB’s] functions, they obviously must yield 
or the [NLRA] would be reduced to a futility.”); Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 
U.S. 350, 361 (1940) (finding contracts founded on “the fruits of unfair labor 
practices, stipulated for the renunciation by the employees of rights guaranteed 
by the [NLRA] . . . were appropriate subjects for [ ]  affirmative remedial ac-
tion”). 
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seemed to be enforceable.8 The NLRB, however, deemed the 
agreement unlawful under Norris-LaGuardia and the NLRA.9 
Three courts of appeals concurred in its reasoning.10 
Seven months after oral argument, a sharply divided Court 
ruled that Epic System’s agreement should be enforced.11 In his 
first major opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch 
concluded that the “emphatic” language of the FAA “clearly” re-
quired that the agreement be enforced according to its terms12 
and that the NLRA’s right to concerted activity did not modify 
the FAA’s commands.13 Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg reasoned that the agreement’s waiver of the right to engage 
in collective dispute resolution was the exact type of employee-
disempowering “agreement” that Norris-LaGuardia and the 
NLRA aimed to prevent.14 Pointing out that the Court’s decision 
would undermine enforcement of federal wage and hour law, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[c]ongressional correction of the 
Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’ rights to act in concert 
is urgently in order.”15 Justice Gorsuch conceded that the legal 
status of collective action waivers was contested and invited 
Congress to revisit the issue.16 But he maintained that, under 
the law as it stood, the agreement’s lawfulness was “clear.”17 
The debate in Epic Systems highlights a problem of statu-
tory interpretation with important consequences for access to 
civil justice and the powers of federal administrative agencies.18 
 
 8. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1616 (“[T]he Federal Arbitration Act gener-
ally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written.”). 
 9. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292–93 (2012) (denying en-
forcement). 
 10. See NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 402 (6th Cir. 2017); Morris 
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 894 F. 3d 
1093 (9th Cir. 2018); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 
2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 11. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
 12. Id. at 1621–22. 
 13. Id. at 1624. 
 14. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 1633 (majority opinion). 
 16. Id. at 1632 (“Congress is of course always free to amend this judg-
ment.”). 
 17. Id. at 1619. Justice Gorsuch apparently did not recognize the irony of 
labelling the answer to a question that had divided the courts of appeals, the 
NLRB, and two solicitor general’s offices “clear.” 
 18. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 
368–69 (2018) (describing legal disputes over the “flurry of [agency] regulation” 
restricting the use of arbitration as “the next battleground in the ‘arbitration 
war’”); cf. Maureen A. Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal 
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Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court dramatically ex-
panded the scope of arbitration under the FAA, discarding read-
ings of the statute that for most of the twentieth century limited 
arbitration’s impact on federal regulatory programs.19 As the 
scope of arbitration expanded, regulated parties increasingly 
used it in ways that conflicted with statutes such as the NLRA.20 
Agencies such as the NLRB responded by drawing on statutes 
they administered to limit or prohibit the use of arbitration.21 
Those statutes often contain broad delegations of regulatory au-
thority.22 For example, the NLRA gives the NLRB exclusive ju-
risdiction to adjudicate federal unfair-labor practice claims, and 
courts have extended Chevron deference to the Board’s interpre-
tation of the Act.23 But the statutes do not explicitly address 
agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration.24 Seizing on this am-
biguity, businesses challenged agency regulations on the ground 
that they violated the FAA.25 
The validity of the challenged agency regulations depends 
in the first instance on how the FAA relates to other federal laws. 
But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is strangely inconclusive 
on that subject. The Court has said that Section 2 of the FAA 
expresses a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments,”26 and that a party opposing arbitration of a claim cov-
ered by an arbitration agreement has the burden of showing why 
 
Arbitration Act and Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIA-
TION 59, 65 (2013) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s current interpretation 
of the FAA “poses a risk to deny access to, and the operation of, administrative 
agency procedures specifically established to handle certain claims”). 
 19. See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 23. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (“The Board is empowered . . . to prevent 
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”); 
see, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 
(1987) (reviewing the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA using the Chevron 
framework); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 
1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Chevron affords the NLRB broad 
interpretive discretion). 
 24. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). 
 25. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 26. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
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the claim is not arbitrable.27 The Court has also ruled that stat-
utory claims are presumptively arbitrable,28 and it has rejected 
arguments that Congress necessarily intended claims under var-
ious regulatory statutes to be asserted in court rather than arbi-
tration.29 But the Supreme Court has not set out a framework 
that explains how the FAA relates to other laws and the circum-
stances in which another federal statute qualifies the FAA’s 
rules of dispute resolution procedure—most prominently, the 
principle that courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate “ac-
cording to their terms.”30 
This Article develops a theory that answers those ques-
tions.31 Because this Article aims to contribute to ongoing de-
 
 27. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987); 
see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018) (noting that the 
Court had rejected attempts to “conjure” conflicts between the FAA and other 
statutory regimes). 
 28. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 
(1991); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226. 
 29. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 96, 117 (2012) 
(holding that claims under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1679 (2012), are arbitrable); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (holding claims under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012), are arbitrable); 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1989) 
(holding that claims can be arbitrated under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. § 77a (2012)). 
 30. See CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 98; cf. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (holding the FAA 
preempts inconsistent state laws). 
 31. This Article’s theory of the FAA’s place in federal law builds on two re-
lated literatures. The first considers agency arbitration regulation from norma-
tive and institutional perspectives and evaluates the costs and benefits of arbi-
tration and agency action regulating how it is used. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph 
Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 275–76 (2013) (noting regulation by federal administrative 
agencies as a possible regulatory response to the rise of mandatory arbitration 
in consumer and employment contracts); Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbi-
tration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 992 (2017) (examining “the roles that federal 
administrative agencies have begun to play in response to the rise of private 
arbitration” and “how agencies can partially address some of the concerns that 
scholars of regulation and civil procedure have noted regarding the rise of arbi-
tration”); David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 990–91 
(2017) [hereinafter Noll, Regulating Arbitration] (examining the policy ration-
ales for regulating arbitration through federal regulation and administrative 
action and arguing that policymakers should focus on arbitration’s effects on 
the implementation of statutory policy). The second literature considers the re-
lationship between the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence and specific 
regulatory regimes such as the NLRA. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Collective 
Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration: Implications of D.R. Horton and 
Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 179 (2014) (explaining “why 
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bates over the limits of arbitration and the validity of agency ar-
bitration regulations, it does not revisit the questions of statu-
tory interpretation that have preoccupied federal arbitration ju-
risprudence for the past three decades—whether the FAA 
permits arbitration of federal statutory claims, the circum-
stances in which the FAA preempts state regulation, and the ex-
tent of contracting parties’ control over the procedures used in 
arbitration.32 Instead, this Article develops a general theory of 
the FAA’s place in federal law. What type of statute is the FAA? 
When are the Act’s commands affected by another federal law? 
And what must another statute say to modify the FAA?33 
That theory of the FAA proceeds from two basic proposi-
tions: (1) the FAA establishes default rules governing the status 
and enforceability of arbitration agreements; and (2) whether 
another law modifies the FAA’s background commands presents 
an ordinary question of statutory interpretation. The FAA is not, 
 
collective action waivers or requirements to arbitrate individually are unen-
forceable under the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act”); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Mer-
ger Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2015) (suggesting that the Federal 
Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division should ad-
dress arbitration’s anti-competitive effects by conditioning merger approval on 
firms not imposing mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts); Daniel G. 
Lloyd, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the Federal Arbitration Act: The 
Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (arguing 
that the Federal Trade Commission has authority to regulate the use of arbi-
tration under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act); Charles A. Sullivan & Timo-
thy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dis-
pute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1032 (2013) (defending the National 
Labor Relations Board’s conclusion that an employment agreement that waives 
the employee’s right to engage in collective dispute resolution violates the 
NLRA); Note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s Determi-
nation of Substantive Statutory Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 907, 907–09 (2015) 
(examining the conflict between the FAA and the right to engage in concerted 
activity under the NLRA and arguing that the NLRB’s interpretation of the Act 
qualifies for judicial deference). Neither of these literatures offers a general the-
ory of the FAA’s place in federal law or the circumstances in which other stat-
utes modify the FAA’s rules of dispute resolution procedure. In addition, most 
scholars that have considered the question conclude that a statute which allows 
an agency to speak with the force of law under Chevron authorizes the agency 
to regulate the use of arbitration. As shown below, that argument misapplies 
Chevron. See infra notes 339–52 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 148–55 (1992). 
 33. In considering these questions, this Article relies on the text, historical 
context, and textually discernable purposes of the FAA and other federal stat-
utes. None of this Article’s claims depend on drawing an equivalence between 
statutory meaning and intentions revealed in forms of legislative history such 
as committee hearings or floor statements. 
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on any accepted theory of statutory interpretation, a “super-stat-
ute” that occupies a special position in federal law.34  
Enacted in 1925 “to overcome judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion,”35 the FAA does not take precedence over other laws in the 
same manner as cross-cutting statutes such as the Endangered 
Species Act or Religious Freedom Restoration Act.36 Instead, the 
FAA functions like the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 
establishes procedural defaults that apply unless and until an-
other statute modifies its commands.37 As is widely recognized, 
statutes that expressly address the validity, enforceability, or 
revocability of agreements to arbitrate qualify the FAA. But un-
der ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, a range of 
laws also impliedly qualify the FAA.38 Among them are federal 
statutes governing primary conduct, statutes that prescribe spe-
cific procedures and remedies for statutory claims, statutes that 
charge an agency with overseeing regulated parties’ contracting, 
and statutes that direct an agency to promulgate a subsidiary 
statutory policy that is negatively affected by the use of arbitra-
tion.39 
These statutes provide authority for a number of contested 
agency arbitration regulations, among them the 2016 Long Term 
Care Rule promulgated by the Centers for Medicaid and Medi-
care Services (CMS),40 the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau’s 2017 Arbitration Rule (which has been repealed by Con-
gress),41 and the 2016 Borrower Defense rule promulgated by the 
Department of Education (DOE).42 But there is an important 
category of statutes that do not qualify the FAA, and therefore 
do not provide authority for agency arbitration regulation. These 
are the type of statutes at issue in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
 
 34. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUB-
LIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16–17 (2010) (describing 
the developmental process that results in a statute acquiring “super” status).  
 35. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). 
 36. See infra text accompanying note 149. 
 37. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra Part III.B. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 68,688 (Oct. 4, 2016). 
 41. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017), re-
pealed by Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017). 
 42. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 
1, 2016) (final rule). 
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.43 Chevron teaches that an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute that it is charged 
with administering is authoritative.44 But Chevron addresses a 
different set of “statutory circumstances” than those relevant to 
agency arbitration regulation, one in which Congress has 
charged a single agency with administering a single law.45 In 
contrast to the scenario Chevron addresses, agency arbitration 
regulation implicates at least two statutes. And one of those stat-
utes, the FAA, detracts from rather than supports the agency’s 
regulatory authority. This difference makes Chevron basically 
irrelevant to agencies’ statutory authority to regulate the use of 
arbitration. 
This Article’s theory of the FAA’s relationship to other fed-
eral laws shows that many of the Trump administration’s efforts 
to rollback Obama-era arbitration rules are based on a legally 
erroneous premise insofar as they assume that the regulating 
agency lacks statutory authority to regulate arbitration. More 
broadly, this Article demonstrates that the FAA is less excep-
tional than critics and supporters of the Supreme Court’s arbi-
tration jurisprudence both tend to assume. In reality, the FAA is 
qualified by a range of laws that directly constrain parties’ free-
dom to arbitrate on terms of their own choosing or authorize an 
agency to regulate the use of arbitration in particular domains. 
Understanding this provides fresh context for current and future 
conflicts over agency arbitration regulation. 
Part I of this Article explains the origins of conflicts over 
agency arbitration regulation and then explains why those con-
flicts turn on the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws. Part 
II begins to work out a theory of the FAA’s place in federal law 
by showing that the FAA functions as a statutory floor that es-
tablishes baseline rules of procedure. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s expansive interpretations of the Act, Part II shows that 
the FAA does not enjoy any special place in federal law; it is a 
statute like any other. Part III turns to the FAA’s relationship 
 
 43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see infra note 349 and accompanying text (collect-
ing scholarship that contends agencies may regulate arbitration under statutes 
that support Chevron deference). 
 44. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40. 
 45. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (explaining 
that in this scenario “[i]t can be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred 
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the 
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in 
the statute or fill[ing] in a space in the enacted law”). 
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to other federal laws. Applying ordinary tools of statutory inter-
pretation, this Part demonstrates that the FAA’s background 
rules of dispute resolution procedure are modified by a range of 
statutes that modify the FAA expressly and impliedly. Those 
statutes supply statutory authority for many contested arbitra-
tion regulations. But as Part IV shows, the FAA is not modified 
by Chevron-type statutes, rendering Chevron essentially irrele-
vant to agency arbitration regulation. Together, Parts II through 
IV present a complete picture of the FAA’s place in federal law. 
As the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence recognizes, the FAA es-
tablishes a federal policy favoring arbitration.46 That policy, 
however, is constrained in important respects by other federal 
statutes and agency action taken under their authority. 
I. THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM 
Until recently, there were few situations where the use of 
arbitration conflicted with federal regulatory statutes. This Part 
explains why, after a long period of peace, conflicts between ar-
bitration and regulatory statutes suddenly appeared in the past 
decade. It then explains why those conflicts turn on the FAA’s 
relationship to other federal laws. 
A. THE RISE OF ARBITRATION CONFLICTS 
1. The Arbitration Revolution 
The story of the FAA’s origins, transformation, and expan-
sion “has been told many times.”47 Enacted by the 68th Congress 
in 1925, the FAA provides that a covered arbitration agreement 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.”48 As is now familiar, the statute was the capstone of a 
decade-long campaign led by the New York State Chamber of 
 
 46. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 
1, 1 (“[In the FAA there is] a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”). 
 47. Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3253407. 
 48. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub L. No. 68-401, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (cod-
ified at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). The FAA covers any “maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” id. § 2, but the FAA does 
not “apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. § 1. 
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Commerce and the American Bar Association to shore up the le-
gal basis for commercial arbitration.49 Before the early twentieth 
century arbitration reform movement, courts often refused to en-
force arbitration agreements between commercial parties on the 
ground that arbitration “ousted” courts from exercising jurisdic-
tion conferred by law or because damages adequately compen-
sated a party whose counter-party refused to honor an agree-
ment to arbitrate.50 Courts also allowed parties to repudiate 
(revoke) arbitration agreements at any point before an arbitra-
tion award was issued on the basis of similar concerns.51 State 
legislation in New York and New Jersey overturned these doc-
trines, but did not apply in federal court under then-prevailing 
conflicts of law principles.52 In providing that an arbitration 
 
 49. The FAA’s historical origins are now the subject of two monographs: (1) 
MACNEIL, supra note 32; and (2) IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: 
THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013). See also Allied-
Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (describing the statute’s legislative history); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal 
Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1946–48 (2014) 
(describing the FAA as part of a broader movement to simplify legal procedure 
in the 1920s and 1930s); Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 
TEX. L. REV. 265, 301–02 (2015) (tracing the legislative history of the FAA); 
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created 
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. L. REV. 99, 
101–03 (2006) (describing the 68th Congress’s goals in the FAA); Luke P. Norris, 
The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 249, 252–53 (2018) (tracing the history 
of FAA § 1 and concluding that § 1 excludes contracts characterized by “wide 
economic disparities . . . between the parties” from arbitration); cf. Christopher 
R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105–07 (2002) (seeking to 
show that the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the FAA is not ruled 
out by the statute’s legislative history). See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Arbi-
tration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Re-
form, 124 YALE L.J. 2940 (2015) (describing early twentieth century legal re-
form movements that influenced thinking about arbitration). 
 50. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–22 (1924) 
(discussing the common law rules and analysis for arbitration disputes). 
 51. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th 
Cong. 14 (1924) [hereinafter Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes] 
(statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber 
of Commerce) (“The difficulty is that men do enter into [arbitration] agreements 
and then afterwards repudiate the agreement, and the difficulty has been that 
for over 300 years . . . the courts have said that . . . an [arbitration] agreement 
was one that was revocable at any time.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124 (“The [New York] Arbitration 
Law deals merely with the remedy in the state courts in respect of obligations 
voluntarily and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either to modify the sub-
stantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty.”). 
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agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,”53 the FAA ex-
pressly overrode the common law “revocability” and “unenforce-
ability” doctrines, making arbitration agreements enforceable in 
federal court.54 
The FAA is a “barebones statute.”55 During congressional 
hearings on the bill that became the FAA, Julius Cohen, the New 
York lawyer considered the FAA’s architect, testified that fed-
eral and state regulatory agencies had broad authority to regu-
late the use of arbitration.56 But the FAA’s text does not address 
the question one way or the other.57 Nor does the FAA address 
the arbitrability of statutory rights, arbitrators’ duty to follow 
statutory procedures and remedies, or the extent of parties’ au-
thority over the procedures used in arbitration.58 Enacted thir-
teen years before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took ef-
fect,59 and before Congress passed the first statute 
contemplating class action enforcement (the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938),60 the FAA says nothing about aggregate dis-
pute resolution.61 
The FAA’s effect on other federal laws depends largely on 
how these interpretive questions are resolved. Although the text 
of FAA Section 2 can be read literally as saying that any piece of 
paper that is denominated an agreement to arbitrate must be 
enforced, this literal reading would produce absurd results. No 
 
 53. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 54. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (“In the 
Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbi-
tration agreements . . . .”). 
 55. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, supra note 31, at 994. 
 56. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, supra note 51, at 15 
(“[W]e have the regulation of the Federal Government, through its regularly 
constituted bodies, and they protect everybody. Railroad contracts and express 
contracts and insurance contracts are provided for. You can not get a provision 
into an insurance contract to-day unless it is approved by the insurance depart-
ment. In other words, people are protected to-day as never before.”). For more 
on Cohen’s role in the FAA’s enactment, see, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 32, at 
28; Hiro N. Aragaki, The Metaphysics of Arbitration: A Reply to Hensler and 
Khatam, 18 NEV. L.J. 541, 557 (2018). 
 57. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909 (1987) (describing the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure). 
 60. The Federal Wages and Hours Act, 52 HARV. L. REV. 646, 669 (1939) 
(describing the FLSA’s collective action provisions). 
 61. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.  
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one thinks that an arbitrator could kill the losing party if the 
agreement so provided. And for most of the twentieth century, 
the statute was interpreted less expansively.62 Three specific as-
sumptions limited the scope of arbitration under the FAA, and 
with it, arbitration’s impact on other federal laws. 
First, courts assumed that the FAA applied only in federal 
courts and did not preempt state laws that guaranteed a judicial 
forum for specific claims.63 Second, courts held that the FAA did 
not allow arbitration of federal statutory claims, based on fears 
that arbitration was not an appropriate forum for vindicating 
those statutes’ public regulatory goals.64 Finally, courts har-
bored doubts about the enforceability of arbitration clauses in 
standard form contracts of adhesion, which reflected uncertainty 
in the law of contract about how to approach contractual boiler-
plate.65 
The FAA has not been substantively amended since the 68th 
Congress enacted it in 1925.66 Notwithstanding Congress’s inac-
tion—and in spite of the “super-strong” form of stare decisis that 
applies to Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes67—
 
 62. See MACNEIL, supra note 32, at 134–38 (providing a historical overview 
of the FAA from 1938 to 1967). 
 63. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 288 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (surveying caselaw prior to Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and concluding that, “to judge from the reported cases, 
it appears that no state court was even asked to enforce the statute for many 
years after the passage of the FAA”). 
 64. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (declining 
to give claim preclusive effect to an arbitration agreement because “[a]rbitral 
procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make 
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of 
rights created by Title VII”); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435, 437 (1953) (rea-
soning that “the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages 
under which buyers labor,” and that its “protective provisions . . . require the 
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness”), overruled by 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 447 (1989). 
 65. See Francis M. Dougherty, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting 
Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 437 (1984) 
(“Historically, agreements which purport to exclude jurisdiction of courts, other 
than those specifically named, and which relate to the adjudication of contro-
versies that might arise in the future, have been found to be against public pol-
icy and have not been enforced.”) For an introduction to modern economic theo-
ries supporting enforcement of contractual boilerplate, see Symposium, 
“Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006). 
 66. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) derivation note. 
 67. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) 
(“[S]tare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a stat-
ute . . . . Congress can correct any mistake it sees.”). See generally William N. 
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the Court rejected each of the above limitations in a series of de-
cisions beginning in 1983. 
The backdrop to these decisions was a marked increase in 
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ litigation and inter-governmental 
regulatory conflicts to which such litigation contributed.68 Be-
tween the end of the Second World War and 1983, Congress en-
acted more than 100 statutes that contained financial incentives 
for private parties and their attorneys to enforce statutory 
rights.69 During the same era, amendments to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 and the extension of the equitable “common 
fund” doctrine to class action litigation gave rise to new forms of 
self-financing plaintiffs’ litigation organized by lawyers who con-
ceived of themselves as “private attorneys general.”70 Mean-
while, the expansion of interstate and international trade in-
creased the number of situations where private civil litigation 
led to conflicts in different sovereigns’ approaches to regulating 
cross-border activity.71 The perceived costs of entrepreneurial 
 
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) 
(identifying statutory stare decisis as a separate form of stare decisis). 
 68. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 
(2015) (discussing the development of class action litigation); Pamela K. Book-
man, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015) (discussing the 
growth of doctrines designed to limit U.S. courts’ influence on foreign affairs); 
David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41 (2014) 
(explaining how private civil litigation generates conflicts among state and na-
tional governments’ approaches to regulation). 
 69. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 66 fig.3.1 (2010). 
 70. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCH-
MENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 1–24 (2017); 
COFFEE, supra note 68, at 52–85; FARHANG, supra note 69, at 60–84; David 
Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 610–14 (2013). On the common fund doc-
trine’s extension to class action litigation, see John P. Dawson, Lawyers and 
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1602–03 
(1974); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Lit-
igation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 915–19 (1975); John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving 
Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1974). On the private attorney gen-
eral concept, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why 
the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 
(1983); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General Is”—And 
Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); see also David L. Noll, The Effect 
of Contingent Fees and Statutory Fee-Shifting, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS 
TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 170 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016) 
(considering the efficacy of contingent attorney’s fees and rules providing for 
statutory fee-shifting in increasing access to civil justice). 
 71. See Noll, supra note 68, at 49–56. 
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litigation and interjurisdictional regulatory conflicts led influen-
tial commentators to argue for expanded use of alternative dis-
pute resolution. Among them was Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
who harbored an almost visceral dislike of the use of litigation to 
address social problems.72 In a 1982 address to the annual meet-
ing of the American Bar Association, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger chronicled the supposed ills of the American civil justice 
system and asked, pointedly, “Isn’t [t]here a [b]etter [w]ay?”73 
Burger’s thinking soon appeared in Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the FAA. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
v. Mercury Construction Corp. and Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
the Court stated in dicta and then held that the FAA reflects a 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” that ap-
plies “in either state or federal court . . . notwithstanding any 
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”74 In 
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon and Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court held 
that the FAA allows arbitration of federal statutory claims in 
both international disputes and those that arise from domestic 
transactions.75 And the Court impliedly accepted that arbitra-
 
 72. See generally SARAH L. STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 38–78 (2015) (discussing the 
Chief Justice’s support of ADR to curb the influx of litigation). 
 73. Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982). 
 74. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (citing Cone). 
In Cone, the Court considered whether a district court could abstain under Col-
orado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), 
from resolving a petition to compel arbitration when another petition based on 
the same underlying controversy was pending in an earlier-filed state-court ac-
tion. Justice William Brennan’s opinion stated, without citation, that FAA § 2 
was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law 
of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of 
the Act.” Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. The Court reasoned that because the state and 
federal court actions involved the same question of law (the agreement’s validity 
under the FAA), “the fact that federal law provides the rule of decision on the 
merits” weighed against federal court abstention. Id. at 23. 
Southland directly considered whether the FAA preempted a provision of 
California’s Franchise Investment Law which barred franchisees from agreeing 
to arbitration was preempted by the FAA. Southland, 465 U.S. at 3, 8. Although 
the franchisee waived the argument that the FAA does not apply outside of the 
federal courts by failing to raise the argument in the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court adopted the Cone dictum as a holding and concluded that state courts 
were bound by FAA § 2. Id. at 15–17.  
 75. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); 
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tion agreements contained in standard form contracts of adhe-
sion had the same status as those contained in contracts negoti-
ated by sophisticated parties.76 
The “arbitration revolution”77 culminated in a pair of deci-
sions which signaled that contracting parties have broad author-
ity over the procedures used in arbitration. AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California doctrine 
that required the availability of classwide arbitration in con-
sumer cases as a check against corporate wrongdoing, because 
the California doctrine conflicted with the FAA’s “purposes and 
objectives.”78 And American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restau-
rant held that, in a challenge to the enforceability of an arbitra-
tion agreement, the fact that arbitration makes it economically 
irrational for a plaintiff to pursue a non-frivolous federal statu-
tory claim (in Italian Colors, for violations of the Sherman Act) 
is not a valid defense to enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment.79 
The Court’s decisions expanding the scope of arbitration un-
der the FAA openly embraced Burger’s view that channeling dis-
putes to arbitration was the cure to the problem of entrepreneur-
ial litigation and the regulatory conflicts that it created.80 By 
 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 
(1985). 
 76. The turning point in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence was Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which enforced a forum selec-
tion clause that appeared in the eighth of the twenty-five numbered paragraphs 
attached to a cruise ticket. Id. at 588. Later arbitration cases impliedly accepted 
the enforceability of boilerplate arbitration agreements or rejected contract law 
challenges to validity of boilerplate agreements out of hand. See, e.g., Marmet 
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531 (2012) (per curiam) (enforcing 
a boilerplate arbitration clause that appeared in a nursing home admission con-
tract); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 97 (2012) (credit card 
agreement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011) 
(cellular telephone service agreement). For skepticism about the Court’s deci-
sion to apply the logic of classical contract law to adhesive arbitration clauses, 
see for example Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: 
Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and 
Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1930 (2017). 
 77. See generally David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the 
Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 70–
76 (2015). 
 78. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. 
 79. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013). 
 80. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Ju-
risdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997) (identifying the Court’s trends of in-
ternationalism and privatization); Noll, supra note 31, at 998–1002 (discussing 
the benefits of enforcing arbitration). 
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reinterpreting the FAA to apply in state courts, preempt incon-
sistent state law, and allow arbitration of statutory claims, the 
Court ensured that defendants doing business in national and 
international markets could channel litigation from local courts 
to a private forum specified by contract.81 This change of forum 
not only reduced procedural costs for defendants engaged in in-
terstate and international commerce but also blunted the impact 
of local regulation to the extent that arbitrators applied the law 
less aggressively than elected state-court judges.82 At the same 
time, the expansion of arbitration allowed defendants who are 
regular targets of entrepreneurial litigation to disable much of 
the procedural infrastructure such litigation depends upon, a re-
sult that conservative interest groups had struggled to attain 
through legislation and court rulemaking.83 In Concepcion, the 
Court reasoned, counter-historically, that “[t]he point of afford-
ing parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to al-
low for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of 
 
 81. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (re-
fusing to interpret FAA in a way that would “carv[e] out an important statutory 
niche in which a State remains free to apply its antiarbitration law or policy”); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 
(1985) (describing an agreement to arbitrate as “an almost indispensable pre-
condition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any 
international business transaction”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 
15–16 (1984) (stating that the Court was “unwilling to attribute to Congress the 
intent . . . to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the 
right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is as-
serted”). 
 82. See Noll, supra note 68, at 68–72 (explaining why the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration decisions fit into a broader line of decisions that aim to reduce inter-
jurisdictional regulatory conflicts). There is a debate, not resolved by existing 
empirical studies, over the extent of local courts’ favoritism toward local parties. 
See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Re-
ally Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdic-
tion, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998) (discussing whether win rates are due to 
removal of cases or case selection). 
 83. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, 
Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 
(2005) (discussing judicial preference for arbitration); Noll, Regulating Arbitra-
tion, supra note 31, at 1026 (explaining how, “by changing the forum and proce-
dures for dispute resolution,” arbitration can influence the returns from private 
statutory enforcement); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration 
Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 126 (2000) (anticipating the Court’s holding that arbitration can be used to 
block class action litigation in certain circumstances). On conservative interest 
groups’ use of judicial interpretation to accomplish results they struggled to 
achieve through legislation and court rulemaking, see BURBANK & FARHANG, 
supra note 70, at 214.  
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dispute,” and held that a state law that interferes with this con-
gressional objective is preempted by the FAA.84 
The result was a “180-degree turn” in the Supreme Court’s 
approach to arbitration under the FAA.85 In 1983, few U.S. 
courts would have ordered arbitration of consumer or employee 
disputes, much less when a state sought to guarantee access to 
a judicial forum to advance the state’s regulatory interests.86 By 
2013, arbitration of such disputes was common.87 And the Su-
preme Court repeatedly intervened to ensure that state courts 
followed its interpretation of the FAA, summarily reversing 
state court decisions that attempted to carve out exceptions to 
the new FAA.88  
This shift was reflected in discussion of the FAA. Law pro-
fessors spoke of the FAA as if it were a quasi-constitutional en-
actment that steamrolled any legal impediment to the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements according to their terms.89 
 
 84. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). On Con-
cepcion’s creative understanding of arbitration, see for example, Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Con-
cepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 
388 (2011) (“In the commercial world, there are numerous examples of arbitra-
tion procedures that specifically contemplate multi-party proceedings.”). 
 85. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 817 (2009). 
 86. See MACNEIL, supra note 32, at 138–39. 
 87. See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Pri-
vate of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE 
L.J. 2804, 2870–71 (2015) (discussing expansion of arbitration in the employ-
ment context). 
 88. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) 
(holding West Virginia’s prohibition of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is 
preempted by the FAA); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) 
(per curiam) (holding an Oklahoma statute does not govern over a federal stat-
ute allowing arbitration); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18 (2011) (per curiam) 
(holding that the FAA requires arbitration as to disputes where an arbitration 
agreement is signed). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction 
and the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2–3 
(2014) (attributing the phenomenon to state court resistance to the Supreme 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence). 
 89. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1215, 1260 (2001) (noting that the “Supreme Court has construed the FAA 
broadly, with a breadth sweeping well beyond the statute’s plain meaning and 
the probable expectations of its framers in 1925”); see also Myriam Gilles, The 
Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 
371, 409 (2016) (suggesting under the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, that 
“entire areas of the law were shunted off into the black box of arbitration”); J. 
Maria Glover, “Encroachments and Oppressions”: The Corporatization of Proce-
dure and the Decline of Rule of Law, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2114 (2018) 
(Under the new FAA, the judiciary no longer “fulfill[s] its unique role in our 
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Arbitration supporters happily embraced this reading, and 
claimed that a wide variety of federal and state law regulating 
dispute resolution procedure was precluded or preempted by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA.90 
2. The Agency Response 
Businesses responded to the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the FAA by dramatically increasing their use of arbitration.91 
But contrary to many accounts, the arbitration revolution did 
not usher in an era of contract procedure in which businesses 
were free to mandate arbitration on terms of their choosing. In-
stead, federal regulatory agencies stepped into the vacuum cre-
ated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA and reg-
ulated the use of arbitration in many domains. 
Agency action regulating the use of arbitration came in two 
waves. Two federal agencies—the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)—have long 
regulated the use of arbitration by actors within their jurisdic-
tion under statutes that do not expressly refer to arbitration.92 
Until recently, this regulation has been uncontroversial. Indeed, 
 
tripartite structure of government to preserve the rule of law”). 
 90. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 8, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-
285) (“This Court has been loath to find that [another statute modifies the 
FAA.]”); Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors at 7, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 
S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-285) (“[A] federal statute will not be interpreted to 
forbid arbitration of claims within its ambit unless it does so expressly . . . .”). 
 91. See, e.g., ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING 
USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1 (2017) (finding that 53.9% of nonunion pri-
vate-sector employers in the United States have mandatory arbitration proce-
dures); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 2, at 7 (2015) (finding that “[s]even of the eight 
largest facilities-based mobile wireless providers (87.5%), covering 99.9% of sub-
scribers, used arbitration clauses in their 2014 customer agreements”); see also 
Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 
682, 708 (2018) (surveying prior empirical studies of employment arbitration 
and concluding it is a “black hole” that serves primarily to suppress claims). 
 92. See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness 
in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 512–17 (2008) (describing the 
SEC’s regulation of mandatory arbitration in the securities industry under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Lloyd, supra note 31, at 18–21 (describing the 
history of the FTC’s regulation of mandatory arbitration under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act). 
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the Supreme Court in 1987 spoke approvingly of the SEC’s over-
sight of securities arbitration in approving arbitration of claims 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.93 
Beginning in the late 1990s and accelerating in the final 
years of the Obama administration, a new wave of agency arbi-
tration regulations appeared.94 Some agency regulations, such 
as the CMS Long-Term Care Rule, sought to address harms 
caused by the confidentiality of the arbitration process.95 Some 
agency regulations, such as the NLRB rulings that the Supreme 
Court rejected in Epic Systems, targeted uses of arbitration that 
the agency concluded violated statutory rights it enforced.96 
Other agency regulations attempted to address arbitration’s ef-
fects on private enforcement of state and federal regulatory pro-
grams.97 Still other regulations sought to address broader mar-
ket failures linked to arbitration. For example, in response to the 
collapse of several for-profit colleges, the Department of Educa-
tion (DOE) Borrower Defense Rule prohibited schools that par-
 
 93. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233–34 
(1987) (“[T]he Commission has broad authority to oversee and to regulate the 
rules adopted by the [self-regulatory organizations] relating to customer dis-
putes, including the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems nec-
essary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory 
rights.”). 
 94. See infra Appendix B. 
 95. See 82 Fed. Reg. 26,649 (proposed June 8, 2017) (proposing to drop the 
arbitration bar in favor of a requirement that arbitration agreements be ex-
plained in “plain language”); Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Fa-
cilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,688 (Oct. 4, 2016) (barring nursing homes from mandat-
ing arbitration in their admission contracts). 
 96. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292 (2012) (concluding that 
an individual employment agreement that prevents the employee from partici-
pating in aggregate dispute resolution to the extent permitted by generally ap-
plicable procedural rules violates the employee’s right to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection under the NLRA and 
Norris-LaGuardia Acts), enforced in part, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013), ad-
hered to on reconsideration, Murphy Oil, 361 N.L.R.B. 774 (2014), enforcement 
denied, Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). For the pertinent 
statutory text, see supra note 5. 
 97. For instance, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) arbi-
tration rule prohibited consumer financial companies from using arbitration 
clauses to block class actions filed in public court based on concerns that arbitral 
class action waivers brought enforcement of federal and state consumer protec-
tion laws below the optimal level. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 
(July 19, 2017), repealed by Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017). 
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ticipate in the federal direct loan program from mandating arbi-
tration and using other contract provisions that interfered with 
students’ ability to litigate predatory lending claims.98 
In regulating arbitration, agencies drew on diverse statu-
tory authorities. CMS issued the Long-Term Care Rule under a 
provision of the Nursing Home Reform Act that directed the 
agency to promulgate regulations “to protect the health, safety, 
welfare, and rights” of nursing home residents.99 The NLRB 
based its rulings prohibiting collective action waivers on provi-
sions of the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia Act that guarantee 
workers’ right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose 
of . . . mutual aid or protection.”100 The DOE issued the Borrower 
Defense Rule under a provision of the Higher Education Act that 
authorizes the department to proscribe contractual provisions 
for educational institutions that “the Secretary [of Education] 
determines are necessary to protect the interests of the United 
States and to promote the purposes of [the Act].”101 The CFPB 
promulgated its arbitration rule under Section 1028(b) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which expressly authorizes the bureau to “pro-
hibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agree-
ment between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer 
financial product or service providing for arbitration of any fu-
ture dispute between the parties.”102 Agencies used a range of 
administrative policymaking forms, from legislative rules under 
 
 98. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1, 
2016) (final rule), amended by 82 Fed. Reg. 49,114 (Oct. 24, 2017). For an ac-
count of the rise of for-profit colleges and their dependence on predatory lending 
financed by the federal government, see generally Blake Shinoda, Note, Ena-
bling Class Litigation as an Approach to Regulating For-Profit Colleges, 87 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1085 (2014) (discussing the regulation of for-profit schools and con-
ditional funding to allow collective actions). 
 99. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(f ) (1), 1396r(f ) (1) (2012). 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion . . . .”); 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (recognizing the public policy of the United 
States that the individual worker “be free from the interference, restraint, or 
coercion of employers of labor . . . in self-organization or in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion”). 
 101. 20 U.S.C. § 1087d(a)(6) (2012). 
 102. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012). 
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Section 553 of the APA to informal applications of agency discre-
tion.103 
By January 2016, fifteen proposed or final agency actions 
regulated the use of arbitration.104 These regulations added to a 
small number of statutes that expressly addressed the use of ar-
bitration in particular domains105 and a handful of longstanding 
agency arbitration regulations that predated the revolution in 
the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence.106 
The result was a variegated body of law in which the rules 
governing arbitration depended on the parties, the type of con-
tract they entered into, and the claims that the parties asserted. 
In some areas, firms could be certain that arbitration agree-
ments would be enforced according to their terms. Elsewhere, 
the use of arbitration was constrained—sometimes prohibited—
by domain-specific agency regulation. 
3. The Attack on Agency Regulation 
Agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration were controver-
sial.107 With a handful of exceptions, every agency action re-
stricting the use of arbitration that became final between 2007 
and the end of the Obama administration was challenged in 
court by an assortment of business groups aligned with the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce.108 
The central theme of the challengers’ arguments was that 
the FAA precluded agency regulation that restricted parties’ 
freedom to mandate arbitration on terms of their choosing.109 In 
 
 103. See, e.g., Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,926 
(legislative rule promulgated under APA § 553); Alison Frankel, Shareholder 
Alert: SEC Commissioner Floats Class-Action-Killing Proposal, REUTERS (July 
18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-arbitration-idUSKBN1A326T 
(describing the SEC’s historical refusal to grant accelerated registration to ini-
tial public offerings where the issuer attempts to require arbitration of share-
holder claims). 
 104. See infra Appendix B. 
 105. See infra note 110. 
 106. See Gross, supra note 92 (describing longstanding arbitration regula-
tions of the SEC); Lloyd, supra note 31 (describing longstanding arbitration reg-
ulations of the FTC). 
 107. See Horton, supra note 18, at 369 (observing that the “flurry of [agency] 
regulation may be the next battleground in the ‘arbitration war’”). 
 108. See infra Appendix A. 
 109. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Epic Sys. 
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285); Brief for Chamber of Com-
merce Plaintiffs-Appellants at 59, Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 
F.3d 360 (2018) (No. 17-10238); Complaint at ¶¶ 100–132, Cal. Ass’n of Private 
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a few recent statutes enacted after the revolution in the Supreme 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence was underway, Congress ex-
plicitly authorized agencies to regulate arbitration.110 But for the 
most part, agencies regulated arbitration under statutes that es-
tablish substantive rights, direct an agency to regulate specific 
harms or particular sectors of the economy, direct an agency to 
police regulated actors’ contracting, or authorize an agency to 
grant exemptions from regulatory requirements. Challengers 
contended that regulations promulgated under the latter stat-
utes conflicted with the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion agreements” and the FAA-based requirement that arbitra-
tion agreements be enforced according to their terms.111 
Courts hearing the challenges splintered. For example, in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, a Texas district court upheld a 
provision of the Department of Labor (DOL) Fiduciary Rule that 
required investment advisors to forego using arbitral class ac-
tion waivers as a valid exercise of DOL’s authority under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).112 
By contrast, in Thrivent Financial Services for Lutherans v. 
Acosta, a Minnesota district court preliminarily enjoined en-
forcement of the same provision based on a concession by the 
 
Postsecondary Sch. v. Devos, No. 1:17-cv-00999, 2018 WL 5017749 (D.D.C. May 
24, 2017) (No. 17-999). 
 110. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 8096, 
131 Stat. 135 (2017) (forbidding defense contractors from requiring employees 
to arbitrate claims for sexual assault and employment discrimination); Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)) (2012) (“No 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement 
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”); id. § 922(a) (“No 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement 
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012)); Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-234, § 11004, 122 Stat. 923 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a)) (“Any 
livestock or poultry contract that contains a provision requiring the use of arbi-
tration to resolve any controversy that may arise under the contract shall con-
tain a provision that allows a producer or grower, prior to entering the contract 
to decline to be bound by the arbitration provision.”). 
 111. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 112. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 3:16-CV-1476-M, 2017 WL 
514424 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017), rev’d following partial concession of invalidity, 
Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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Sessions Justice Department to the effect that DOL lacked au-
thority to regulate arbitration.113 
Beyond disagreeing over the validity of particular agency 
regulations, courts disagreed more broadly over the circum-
stances in which agencies have authority to regulate arbitration. 
The Supreme Court in Epic Systems reasoned that the NLRB’s 
regulation of arbitral class action waivers was invalid because 
the NLRA does not contain a contrary congressional command 
that modifies the FAA’s instruction that parties are free to select 
arbitral procedures of their choosing.114 In contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit in the decision below concluded that procedural choices 
in an agreement to arbitrate are constrained by the guarantee of 
workers’ right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and 
protection, which has long been interpreted as prohibiting waiv-
ers of employees’ right to join together to petition for judicial and 
administrative relief to the extent provided by generally appli-
cable law.115 Because a waiver of that right is a “ground[]  . . . at 
law . . . for the revocation of any contract,” the court concluded 
that it took precedence over the general commands of FAA Sec-
tion 2.116 
Questions about agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration 
have played a central role in the Trump administration’s efforts 
to roll back Obama-era arbitration regulations.117 For example, 
after filing a petition for certiorari that took the NLRB’s side in 
Epic Systems under President Obama,118 the solicitor general 
switched positions after the change in administrations and filed 
an amicus brief arguing that the board’s reading of the NLRA 
was inconsistent with the FAA.119 In Fifth Circuit litigation over 
the DOL Fiduciary Rule, the Justice Department declined to de-
fend the district court decision upholding the rule’s arbitration 
 
 113. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Acosta, No. 16CV03289SRNDTS, 2017 
WL 5135552, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2017). 
 114. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623–24 (2018). 
 115. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See generally David L. Noll, Deregulating Arbitration, 30 LOY. CON-
SUMER L. REV. 51 (2017). 
 118. Petition for Certiorari, NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 16-307 
(Sept. 2016). 
 119. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Epic Sys. Corp. 
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285). 
  
2018] ARBITRATION CONFLICTS 689 
 
provisions “[i]n light of the position adopted by the Acting Solic-
itor General in [Epic Systems].”120 The DOE, now led by billion-
aire philanthropist Betsy DeVos, cited “legal uncertainty” cre-
ated by a legal challenge to the Borrower Defense Rule’s 
arbitration provision as a reason for staying and then reconsid-
ering the rule.121 
Backers of Obama-era rules responded to agencies’ attempts 
to rollback arbitration restrictions by challenging the rollbacks 
under the APA. For example, state attorneys general have filed 
two suits challenging the DOE’s attempt to roll back the Bor-
rower Defense Rule and its refusal to enforce the original rule.122 
The department has defended those suits on the ground that the 
original rule’s arbitration provisions exceeded DOE’s statutory 
authority.123 That defense joins issue on DOE’s authority to reg-
ulate arbitration, even as the department refuses to enforce a 
regulation that is currently on the books.124 
Thus, notwithstanding the change in administrations, the 
extent of agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration remains an 
important and contested question. And the issue’s importance is 
likely to increase. Historically, control of the executive branch 
has shifted between the political parties frequently.125 When and 
if a pro-regulatory administration assumes power, more agen-
cies are likely to regulate arbitration under more statutes, giving 
rise to new conflicts over their authority to do so. 
 
 120. Brief for Appellees at 59, Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 
F.3d 360 (2018) (No. 17-10238). 
 121. Student Assistance General Provisions, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,114 (Oct. 24, 
2017) (interim final rule). 
 122. Complaint, California v. Dep’t of Education, No. 3:17-cv-07106 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 14, 2017); Complaint, Massachusetts v. DeVos, No. 1:17-cv-01331-
RDM (D.D.C. July 6, 2017). 
 123. See Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Massachusetts v. DeVos, No. 
1:17-cv-01331-RDM (Dec. 1, 2017) (citing “serious questions concerning the va-
lidity” of the Borrower Defense Rule raised by the California Association of Pri-
vate Postsecondary Schools’ challenge to the rule as justification for staying it). 
 124. On September 12, 2018, the district court presiding over the Borrower 
Defense rule litigation issued a preliminary injunction vacating the 2017 stay 
of the rule on the ground that the stay was arbitrary and capricious. Bauer v. 
DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2018). This injunction resulted in the original 
2016 rule going into effect on October 12, 2018. Bauer v. DeVos, No. CV 17-1330 
(RDM), 2018 WL 4483783, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2018). The district court has 
indicated that it will address arguments that the 2016 rule is inconsistent with 
the FAA at summary judgment. See Minute Order, Bauer v. DeVos, No. CV 17-
1330 (RDM), 2018 WL 4483783 (D.D.C. May 24, 2018). 
 125. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, 
LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at 1 (2d ed. 2005). 
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B. AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ARBITRATION AS A PROBLEM OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Litigation over agency arbitration regulation highlights an 
institutional dimension to the way that federal law approaches 
arbitration.126 If courts reject agency arbitration regulation on 
the ground that it is precluded by the FAA, the judiciary is the 
only institution that will regulate arbitration.127 (Recall that 
FAA preemption jurisprudence largely excludes states from reg-
ulating arbitration in ways that conflict with the FAA.)128 The 
rules governing arbitration will reflect the courts’—ultimately, 
the Supreme Court’s—reading of the FAA. In contrast, if courts 
uphold agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration, courts and agen-
cies will work together in a kind of partnership to define the 
rules governing arbitration, the longstanding practice in the 
area of securities arbitration.129 
The institutional dimension to conflicts over agency arbitra-
tion regulation has led commentators to approach agencies’ au-
thority to regulate arbitration as a problem of institutional 
choice.130 Seen from this perspective, the question is not whether 
agencies have legal authority to regulate arbitration but which 
institution—the courts or an agency with subject-matter exper-
tise—is better positioned to do so.131 Agency regulation can take 
 
 126. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 127. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 1027–28 (observing that the “current sys-
tem [for regulating arbitration], at least at the federal level, is not one of non-
regulation or congressional control but rather a system characterized by dele-
gation to the courts,” and that “the current system . . . is largely trans-
substantive . . . what the Supreme Court says about the FAA in the context of 
one area of law will also apply to another”). 
 128. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (hold-
ing that the FAA preempts “state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives”). 
 129. See generally L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.2d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (“Courts and agencies are, after all, in a kind of partnership to serve the 
public interest.”); Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of 
Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 907–
08 (1980) (describing Judge Harold Leventhal’s vision of the court-agency part-
nership in administrative law). 
 130. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 995 (suggesting that in general “agencies’ 
ability to amass information about particular regulatory areas will often make 
them better area-specific regulators than either the courts or Congress”). 
 131. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institu-
tions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (“The central question is not ‘how, in 
principle, should a text be interpreted?’ The question instead is ‘how should cer-
tain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret cer-
tain texts?’”). 
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advantage of agencies’ information-gathering abilities and tech-
nical expertise, and respond to changed circumstances more eas-
ily than a court’s interpretation of a statute.132 Insofar as the 
rules governing arbitration raise contested questions of regula-
tory policy, agencies’ accountability to democratic politics 
through the president potentially makes them a better site for 
regulation than the federal courts.133 On the other hand, court 
regulation is comparatively more stable than agency regulation. 
It is better-insulated from electoral politics. And, so long as the 
Supreme Court privileges the FAA over other federal laws, court 
regulation captures the usual benefits of “procedural trans-sub-
stantivity”—the principle that disputes should be resolved using 
the same procedures regardless of the substantive area in which 
they arise.134 
As a legal matter, however, the extent of an agency’s author-
ity to regulate arbitration turns fundamentally on the FAA’s re-
lationship to other laws. That “agencies may act only pursuant 
to authority delegated to them by Congress” is a blackletter prin-
ciple of administrative law.135 A statute authorizing an agency 
to regulate harms such as nursing home abuse ordinarily would 
authorize the agency to regulate uses of arbitration that impact 
that mandate.136 Indeed, the difficulty of anticipating all the de-
 
 132. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 1030–31. 
 133. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865–66 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests 
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left 
to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in 
light of everyday realities.”). 
 134. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 767, 781 (2017) (“That procedural rules are cast at a broad level of gen-
erality and defined in advance of disputes by lawmakers who are unaware of 
how their enactments will affect particular groups provides a powerful guaranty 
of procedural fairness.”). See generally David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and 
the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191 (2013) (noting that 
trans-substantivity advances the values of generality and equality, protects 
against political influence, capture, and bias, and lowers barriers to entry by 
helping generalist lawyers to practice in different practice areas).  
 135. Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 136. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that the 
provision of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, that 
authorized the SEC to regulate reorganization plans authorized the Commis-
sion to regulate management trading during reorganization); FTC v. RF Keppel 
& Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (holding that the provision of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, that authorized FTC to regulate unfair methods 
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velopments that might warrant regulation is a classic justifica-
tion for Congress to delegate broad regulatory authority to an 
agency that it charges with administering a statute in light of 
contemporary conditions.137 But the delegations of regulatory 
authority that agencies have invoked to regulate arbitration ex-
ist alongside the FAA’s instruction that agreements to arbitrate 
are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”138 And the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the FAA to require that covered arbitra-
tion agreements be enforced “according to their terms.”139 
Agency regulation thus implicates conflicting statutory man-
dates: one that broadly supports agency action regulating arbi-
tration (the substantive statute the agency bases its regulation 
upon), and another that, as interpreted by the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts, is broadly deregulatory (the FAA). 
Hence, to understand the extent of agencies’ authority to 
regulate arbitration, one must understand how the FAA relates 
to other federal laws. Is the FAA the only federal statute that 
governs the use and status of agreements to arbitrate? If not, 
when do other statutes supplement or qualify the FAA? And 
what must a statute say to qualify the FAA-based requirement 
that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their 
terms? These questions of statutory interpretation define the ex-
tent of parties’ authority to mandate arbitration on terms of 
their own choosing, and the circumstances in which an agency 
acting under a substantive regulatory statute may regulate the 
use of arbitration. 
II.  THE FAA AS BASELINE   
The remaining three Parts of this Article develop a theory of 
how the FAA relates to other federal statutes, focusing specifi-
cally on substantive regulatory statutes that federal administra-
 
of competition permitted FTC to regulate “break and take” candy packaging). 
 137. See, e.g., RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE 
BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1987) (“Government has assumed in-
creasing responsibility in an ever-expanding number of issue areas in the twen-
tieth century . . . . The sheer volume and technical complexity of the world are 
more than Congress, with its limited membership and staff, can manage 
alone.”); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014) (describing areas where “agencies have been left for 
relatively long periods to adapt existing law to new challenges”). 
 138. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 139. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
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tive agencies have invoked to regulate arbitration. Some ele-
ments of that theory have been recognized in caselaw or prior 
scholarship,140 but they have not been integrated into a general 
theory of the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws. Develop-
ing such a theory and explaining its implications for administra-
tive agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration are this Article’s pri-
mary contributions to debates over the limits and regulation of 
arbitration. 
Of course, understanding the FAA’s relationship to other 
federal laws does not answer all questions about the appropriate 
legal and policy response to arbitration. The Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the FAA’s “purposes and objectives” preempt 
state regulation that the Court deems inconsistent with the FAA 
remains controversial and undertheorized.141 And understand-
ing the extent of agencies’ legal authority to regulate arbitration 
does not answer whether they should do so as a policy matter. 
Elsewhere, I have surveyed the economic arguments for judicial 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitration’s costs for 
consumer welfare, democratic governance, and the implementa-
tion of federal statutory policy, and argued that federal legisla-
tion and regulation should focus on arbitration’s effects on the 
implementation of federal statutory policy.142 The #MeToo move-
ment has shed light on the role that arbitration has played in 
shielding powerful actors from accountability for wrongdoing.143 
In light of those revelations, and the policy coalitions they have 
mobilized, the debate over the proper policy response to arbitra-
tion will continue.144 
 
 140. See infra notes 215–17 (noting Supreme Court cases that recognize that 
the FAA may be displaced by a contrary congressional command); infra notes 
244–48 (noting cases which hold that arbitrators must respect substantive 
rights and statutory procedures and remedies). 
 141. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see, e.g., David Horton, Federal 
Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 
1217 (2013); Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Fed-
eral and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 
1878–88 (2016). 
 142. See Noll, Regulating Arbitration, supra note 31. 
 143. See Ronan Farrow, Donald Trump, a Playboy Model, and a System for 
Concealing Infidelity, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2018; Ronan Farrow, Harvey 
Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 2017; Megan Twohey et 
al., Weinstein’s Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2017. 
 144. See Letter from Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney Gen. of Fla. et al., to Paul 
Ryan, Speaker of the House, Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Dis-
putes (Feb. 12, 2018) (bi-partisan letter from fifty-six state attorneys general 
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But first, there is the question of legal authority. If the FAA 
precludes agencies from regulating arbitration in areas of their 
authority, as arbitration supporters contend, then agencies are 
powerless to regulate arbitration until Congress passes new leg-
islation authorizing them to do so. On the other hand, if agencies 
have authority to regulate arbitration under statutes they al-
ready administer, the questions are how that discretion should 
be exercised, and whether agencies under Trump have abused 
their discretion in rolling back Obama-era arbitration re-
strictions. The question of authority is also central to legal chal-
lenges such as Epic Systems, which are premised on the view 
that the FAA takes precedence over conflicting laws.145 
This Part begins by showing that the FAA functions as a 
statutory floor: the statute establishes baseline rules of dispute-
resolution procedure that apply unless and until the Act is qual-
ified by another law. And contrary to arbitration supporters’ 
claims, the FAA does not enjoy special status in federal law. Ra-
ther, basic principles of statutory interpretation and constitu-
tional law show that it is a law like any other. 
A. FLOOR OR CEILING? 
The first question when considering the FAA’s relationship 
to other federal laws is whether the FAA functions as a statutory 
floor or ceiling.146 This distinction, which is commonly invoked 
in preemption jurisprudence, captures the different ways that a 
cross-cutting statute may interact with other laws.147 Some 
cross-cutting statutes, such as the APA, establish default rules 
that apply unless and until they are modified by another law.148 
Others, such as the Endangered Species Act and Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, impose requirements that supersede other 
 
urging Congress to enact “appropriately-tailored legislation to ensure that sex-
ual harassment victims have a right to their day in court”). 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 2–17. 
 146. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563 (2009). 
 147. See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND 
THE REGULATORY STATE 173 (2d ed. 2017) (discussing the challenges of apply-
ing cross-cutting government-wide statutes in situations that lawmakers did 
not explicitly contemplate). 
 148. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012); see Dimaren v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 398 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act “governs all administrative proceedings except to the extent 
that another statute exempts the agency from coverage”). On the APA’s status 
as a procedural default that applies in the absence of an “exemption,” see Wong 
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
  
2018] ARBITRATION CONFLICTS 695 
 
laws.149 If the FAA functions as a floor, it establishes default 
rules for dispute resolution that other statutes can modify. If the 
FAA functions as a ceiling, its requirements trump those im-
posed by other federal laws. 
Several factors show that the FAA functions as a floor, not 
a ceiling. First, it is widely accepted that Congress enacted the 
FAA to overcome the “judicial hostility to arbitration” reflected 
in the common law revocability and unenforceability doc-
trines.150 There is no apparent reason why a statute intended to 
overcome judicial hostility to arbitration would take precedence 
over other federal laws enacted by Congress. Second, the FAA 
lacks language specifying that it “applies to all Federal law”151 
or that Federal departments and agencies “shall . . . insure that 
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by [them]” are con-
sistent with the FAA.152 The presence of similar language in 
statutes that function as a ceiling is evidence that the FAA does 
not do so. 
Congress’s legislative activity since the FAA’s enactment is 
further evidence that it functions as a floor and not a ceiling. A 
number of statutes, many enacted long after the FAA, establish 
special rules governing the use of arbitration in particular do-
mains.153 For example, 1982 amendments to the Patent Act pro-
vide that while parties may resolve patent infringement claims 
by arbitration, an arbitration award resolving a patent infringe-
ment claim does not take effect until it is delivered to the Patent 
and Trademark Office for recording in the patent’s prosecution 
history.154 Under ordinary interpretive principles, these statutes 
 
 149. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (“Each Federal agency shall, in con-
sultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or re-
sult in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which 
is determined . . . to be critical . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) (2012) (“Govern-
ment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in sub-
section (b).”); id. § 2000bb–2(1) (defining “government” as “a branch, depart-
ment, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color 
of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity”). 
 150. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (empha-
sis added). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–3. 
 152. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 153. See supra note 110. 
 154. Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 3(a), 96 Stat. 317, 322 (1982) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 294(c)-(e) (2012)) (“An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding be-
tween the parties to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other 
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modify the FAA’s general command that agreements to arbitrate 
are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”155 That result would be 
impossible if the FAA functioned as a statutory ceiling that 
trumped other laws. 
FAA Section 2’s savings clause, which provides that arbitra-
tion agreements are not enforceable for reasons that exist “at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” does identify one 
situation in which the FAA’s general rules do not apply.156 Par-
ties challenging agency arbitration regulations have pointed to 
the savings clause to argue that, unless a law applies to contracts 
generally, it cannot modify the FAA, and the Supreme Court in 
Epic Systems appeared to embrace this argument.157 According 
to this argument, the savings clause functions as a conflicts-of-
law rule. It says, by negative implication, that the only situation 
in which another statute modifies the FAA’s rules of dispute res-
olution procedure is when the statute establishes a generally ap-
plicable contract law defense. 
But this reading cannot be right. To see why, consider the 
provision of the Patent Act noted above.158 If the savings clause 
identified the only circumstance in which an arbitration agree-
ment is unenforceable, the Patent Act would have no effect on 
the validity of an arbitration award resolving a patent infringe-
ment claim, because the Act does not establish a defense to en-
forcement of “any contract.” That interpretation conflicts with 
the ordinary and natural reading of the two acts. Its implausi-
bility suggests that that the savings clause does not address the 
FAA’s relationship to other federal laws but to the common law 
 
person. . . . When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee 
or licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the Director. . . . The award 
shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsection (d) is received by 
the Director.”). 
 155. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see, e.g., Morales v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statu-
tory construction that the specific governs the general . . . .”); Watt v. Alaska, 
451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (“[T]he more recent of two irreconcilably conflicting 
statutes governs.”). 
 156. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 157. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“[A]n argu-
ment that a contract is unenforceable just because it requires bilateral arbitra-
tion is a different creature. A defense of that kind . . . is one that impermissibly 
disfavors arbitration whether it sounds in illegality or unconscionability.”); cf. 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 33, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 
S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“Just as the saving clause was held not to encompass 
the state-law rule at issue in Concepcion, it does not encompass the analogous 
federal-law rule that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits derived from the NLRA.”). 
 158. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c)–(d). 
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of contracts. The clause says that, while Section 2 overrides the 
common law non-enforceability and revocability doctrines, “a 
party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to 
avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement.”159 
Were there any doubt about the matter, the Supreme Court 
expressly held in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon 
that the FAA functions as a statutory floor.160 McMahon was the 
first case on the arbitrability of statutory rights that the Su-
preme Court decided after Mitsubishi rejected the view that stat-
utory claims are categorically ineligible for arbitration.161 The 
question was whether to extend Mitsubishi to domestic transac-
tions,162 particularly whether parties could bind themselves to 
arbitrate claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act.163 
The Court answered “yes,” reasoning in an opinion by Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor that the FAA’s meaning did not vary 
depending on the domestic or international nature of the trans-
action that gave rise to a demand for arbitration.164 This did not 
mean that claims under federal regulatory statutes were auto-
matically arbitrable, however. The Court reasoned that the FAA 
“standing alone. . . mandates enforcement of agreements to ar-
bitrate statutory claims.”165 But, “[l]ike any statutory directive, 
the Arbitration Act’s mandate may be overridden by a contrary 
congressional command.”166 The party opposing arbitration had 
the “burden” of “show[ing] that Congress intended to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”167 
“If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial 
forum for a particular claim,” that intent would be “deducible 
 
 159. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984). 
 160. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 161. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985). 
 162. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 224. 
 163. Id. at 222. 
 164. See id. at 232 (reasoning that “the competence of arbitral tribunals to 
resolve § 10(b) claims is the same” in both the domestic and international con-
texts). 
 165. Id. at 226. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 224, 227. 
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from [the statute’s] text or legislative history, or from an inher-
ent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying 
purposes.”168 
McMahon thus clarified what is plain from the FAA’s text, 
structure, and other federal laws. The FAA establishes default 
rules of dispute-resolution procedure that apply in the absence 
of another law qualifying the FAA. “Like any statutory di-
rective,” however, the FAA’s defaults may be modified by other 
laws.169 
B. DOES THE FAA OCCUPY A SPECIAL POSITION IN FEDERAL 
LAW? 
Opponents of agency arbitration regulation generally con-
cede that the FAA functions as a statutory floor. But they con-
tend that, even so, the FAA may only be modified by specific 
kinds of statutory language. This argument posits that the FAA 
functions as a “super-statute” that occupies a special place in 
federal law. Because of its specialness, the FAA exerts a kind of 
gravitational pull on federal law that favors arbitration. Alt-
hough Congress is free to modify the FAA’s defaults in particular 
domains, it must speak clearly if it wishes to do so.170 
This argument, however, gives the FAA a status that the 
statute itself does not contemplate, and that Congress could not 
constitutionally confer on it. And arguments for treating the 
FAA as a super-statute ignore the deep controversy that sur-
rounds the Supreme Court’s expansion of arbitration under the 
FAA and the fact that, with one exception, Congress has not em-
braced the Court’s expansion of the FAA. The upshot is that the 
FAA is a statute like any other. Because arguments for treating 
 
 168. Id. at 227 (emphasis added) (citations and internal punctuation omit-
ted). 
 169. Id. at 226. 
 170. See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18–19, Epic 
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (party seeking to show 
that FAA has been displaced bears a “formidable burden. . . . When examining 
text and legislative history, the Court has looked for evidence that Congress 
intended to address arbitration agreements in particular ” ); Complaint at ¶ 20, 
Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (No. 
3:16CV233-MPM-RP) (“[W]hen Congress wishes to vest federal agencies with 
the authority to regulate or prohibit the use of arbitration agreements in certain 
industries, Congress has used unambiguous statutory language to confer that 
authority.”). See also Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors at 7, Epic Sys. Corp. 
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (16-285) (“[A] federal statute will not be inter-
preted to forbid arbitration of claims within its ambit unless it does so ex-
pressly . . . .”). 
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the FAA as a super-statute are unpersuasive, the FAA’s relation-
ship to other federal laws presents an ordinary question of stat-
utory interpretation. 
1. Textual Silence 
The most basic reason why the FAA does not enjoy special 
status in federal law is that the statute says nothing about its 
relationship to other federal laws. True, Section 2’s savings 
clause provides that courts may refuse to enforce arbitration 
agreements on generally applicable contract grounds.171 But as 
shown above, that clause merely preserves common law contract 
defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements rather 
than addressing the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws. 
The FAA’s silence about its relationship to other statutes is 
unsurprising when the statute is considered in historical con-
text. When the 68th Congress enacted the FAA, a total of thir-
teen executive agencies and departments existed.172 Federal 
court procedure was controlled by the Conformity Act, an 1872 
statute that directed federal courts to follow procedures used by 
state courts.173 
Congress had yet to enact major regulatory statutes that en-
tered federal law during the New Deal and the many post-World 
War II statutes that mobilized private enforcement through fi-
nancial incentives for civil litigation.174 The Rules Enabling Act 
would not be enacted for nine years, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for thirteen, and the APA for twenty-one.175 Before 
any of these laws entered the U.S. Code, the nation would plunge 
 
 171. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 172. They were: the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, State, Defense, 
Treasury, Commerce, and Labor; the Mississippi River Commission; the Fed-
eral Trade Commission; and the U.S. International Trade Commission. CTR. 
FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTS., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXEC-
UTIVE AGENCIES, SOURCEBOOK (Dec. 2012), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/ 
sourcebook.php. 
 173. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196. 
 174. See FARHANG, supra note 69, at 30 (describing mechanisms through 
which financial incentives for litigation contribute to the development of a bar 
of private lawyers who enforce public regulatory statutes). 
 175. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 
Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012)); Rules Enabling 
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2071–77 (2012)). For the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see 
Cumulative Supplement V to the Code of the Laws of the United States of Amer-
ica 852–900 (1939). 
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into depression and elect a new liberal government that under-
took a massive reconfiguration of the national economy.176 Alt-
hough it is inaccurate to describe the pre-New Deal government 
as thoroughly laissez-faire,177 the federal regulatory state was 
early in development. In this environment, there was little rea-
son for Congress to have been concerned with the FAA’s relation-
ship to other federal regulatory statutes. The administrative 
state was in its infancy. The modern “litigation state” created by 
Congress’s delegations of enforcement authority to private liti-
gants and their lawyers did not exist.178 
Nor could Congress have given the FAA a special position in 
federal law if it had wished to do so: “[j]ust as a corporate board 
of directors cannot adopt an immutable policy, legislators cannot 
make their laws irrepealable or disable themselves or their suc-
cessors from taking action[.]”179 This non-entrenchment princi-
ple reflects the co-equal status of different Congresses and is it-
self an entrenched feature of federal constitutional law.180 Under 
it, “there is no legal effect to a statutory provision stating that 
any exceptions to the statute’s requirements must be express, or 
 
 176. See Nicholas Crafts & Peter Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great De-
pression, 26 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, 285, 303–06 (2010). 
 177. See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, 10–15 (2016); JERRY L. MASHAW, 
CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13–14 (2012); see also Maggie 
McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE 
L.J. 1538, 1579 (2018). 
 178. See generally FARHANG, supra note 69 (noting the low rate of private 
statutory enforcement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century). 
 179. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 278 (2012). 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872–73 (1996) 
(plurality opinion); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932). See gener-
ally Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment 
and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381–93 (1987) (defining the 
entrenchment principle and discussing its practical concerns); Michael J. Klar-
man, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 
491, 509 (1997) (noting that entrenchment violates “the democratic principle 
that present majorities rule themselves”); John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and 
Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2003) (“[C]onventional wisdom is 
that . . . one legislature cannot bind a future legislature.”). But see Eric A. Pos-
ner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002) (arguing “that the rule barring legislative entrenchment 
should be discarded; legislatures should be allowed to bind their successors, 
subject to any independent constitutional limits in force”). 
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must specifically refer to the statute.”181 Thus, even if the FAA 
contained a provision stating that it controls unless it is ex-
pressly modified, that provision would be a nullity. 
2. Arguments from Arbitrability Jurisprudence 
The central legal argument for approaching the FAA as if it 
occupied a special place in federal law is based on the Supreme 
Court’s arbitrability jurisprudence—the body of law that ad-
dresses disputes that may be resolved via arbitration.182 After 
the Court abandoned its view that the FAA categorically ex-
cludes arbitration of statutory claims in Mitsubishi, it had to ex-
plain which statutory claims could be arbitrated.183 As already 
noted, McMahon held that the FAA generally requires arbitra-
tion of statutory claims that are covered by a valid arbitration 
agreement, and that a “contrary congressional command” could 
qualify this requirement.184 The Court then decided a series of 
cases holding that claims under particular statutes were arbi-
trable because they lacked a sufficiently clear congressional com-
mand to modify the FAA.185 Opponents of agency arbitration reg-
ulation draw on these cases to argue that, unless a statute 
specifically mentions arbitration, it does not affect the FAA.186 
 
 181. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 179, at 279 (citing the APA’s conflict-of-
laws clause, 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012), as an example of such a provision). 
 182. See generally Deborah Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbi-
tration: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and 
Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381, 
383–93 (2018) (describing the Supreme Court’s expansion of arbitrability under 
the FAA); see also David L. Noll, Response: Public Litigation, Private Arbitra-
tion?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477 (2018) (considering the possibility that arbitrability be 
tied to the public or private nature of disputes).  
 183. See Mark A. Cleaves, An Irresistible Force Meets an Immovable Object: 
Reforming Current Standards as to the Arbitration of Statutory Claims, 8 J.L. 
& COM. 245, 262 (1988). 
 184. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 (1987). 
 185. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (Credit Re-
pair Organizations Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933) (overruling 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
 186. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at 15, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“Bilat-
eral arbitration agreements should be enforced absent a specific congressional 
command to the contrary.”); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“When . . . a party maintains that another 
federal statute provides grounds for invalidating an arbitration agreement, this 
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But the Supreme Court’s arbitrability cases do not hold that 
a statute must use magic words to qualify the FAA. To the con-
trary, those cases have long recognized that other statutes may 
impliedly modify the FAA, most obviously when they establish 
rules governing primary conduct (e.g., prohibiting discrimina-
tory employment practices) or establish specific procedures and 
remedies for statutory claims.187 An arbitration agreement that 
waived those rights would be enforceable if it were judged under 
the FAA alone provided it did not violate generally applicable 
contract-law principles. But the Court’s long-standing and oft-
stated view is that, where an agreement’s “choice-of-forum and 
choice-of-law clauses operate[] in tandem as a prospective 
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” the 
agreement cannot be enforced.188 
Opponents of agency arbitration regulation also invoke the 
canon against implied repeals to argue that Congress must ex-
pressly authorize departures from the FAA.189 But this argu-
ment distorts the canon. 
The implied-repeals canon holds that “repeals by implica-
tion are not favored and will not be presumed unless the inten-
tion of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.”190 It rep-
resents a judicial rule-of-thumb for cases where the legislature 
enacted a law that addresses a specific problem and then enacted 
a more general law that conflicts with the earlier law. The canon 
teaches that in these circumstances, the later and more general 
 
Court has asked whether the other federal statute contains a ‘contrary congres-
sional command’ overriding the FAA’s mandate that arbitration agreements be 
enforced according to their terms.”). 
 187. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) 
(reasoning that when “Congress has taken some measures to facilitate the liti-
gation of [particular] claims,” those measures must be followed in arbitration); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in 
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”). 
 188. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. 
 189. See, e.g., Brief for Epic Systems Corporation and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 
at 14, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285); Complaint 
at ¶ 20, Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 
2016) (No. 3:16CV233-MPM-RP); see also Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-
Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 
1093 (2011) (“Like implied repeals of statutes generally, implied repeals of the 
FAA are disfavored, such that the inclusion of a private right of action in an-
other statute—even an unwaivable right—will not operate to displace the 
FAA.”). 
 190. Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010) (quoting Hawaii v. Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009)). 
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law does not override (repeal) the earlier law unless finding an 
implied repeal is the only way to give effect to the later-enacted 
statute.191 As the Supreme Court has explained, the rationale for 
the rule is that the later legislature would not intend its handi-
work to take priority over the earlier enactment, even though 
the later enactment’s literal language can be read as doing so: 
[W]hen the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a 
subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general 
terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly 
contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as intended to 
affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is 
absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order 
that its words shall have any meaning at all.192 
The FAA is not the kind of statute that the implied-repeals 
canon aims to protect against accidental repeal. Far from ad-
dressing a specific problem, the FAA’s cross-cutting, govern-
ment-wide commands were enacted to override the general hos-
tility to arbitration reflected in the common law revocability and 
unenforceability doctrines.193 From the perspective of the im-
plied-repeals canon, it is natural that later statutes enacted to 
address specific regulatory problems would qualify the FAA’s 
cross-cutting commands. 
3. The FAA as “Super-Statute” 
Apart from textual and legal arguments for requiring Con-
gress to use specific language if it wishes to modify the FAA, one 
might argue that the FAA has acquired the status of a super-
statute. On this view—advanced by both critics and supporters 
of the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence—the FAA occupies a 
 
 191. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Def. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 663 
(2007); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976). Descrip-
tions of the canon in other cases can be read as stating that it establishes a kind 
of general presumption against statutory change, which protects earlier-en-
acted laws against being modified until they are expressly repealed. See, e.g., 
Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010) (“As we have emphasized, repeals 
by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of 
the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.” (quoting Hawaii v. Office of Ha-
waiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 174 (2009))). But this understanding of the statute 
is ahistorical and is in tension with the principle that one legislature may not 
insulate its enactments from modification by another. 
 192. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153 (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, THE IN-
TERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
98 (2d ed. 1874)). 
 193. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625–27. 
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place between that of a normal statute and a constitutional en-
actment.194 Because the FAA is, de facto, higher law, it controls 
the treatment of arbitration unless Congress makes unmistaka-
bly clear that it wishes to depart from the FAA’s defaults. 
But the FAA is not a super-statute. Although scholars disa-
gree over the conditions in which a statute acquires “super” sta-
tus,195 a helpful guide is provided by Professor William Eskridge 
and John Ferejohn’s exhaustive recent treatment of the subject. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that the transition from ordinary to 
super-statute reflects a process of deliberation, implementation, 
and entrenchment that cements a statute’s normative commit-
ments in legal and popular culture. In their telling, “[e]very su-
per-statutory policy begins with an important public need and, 
usually, strong political demand.”196 Policy entrenchment usu-
ally involves administrators and courts finding “practical and 
cost-effective ways to implement the putative super[-]statute” 
and “ways to appeal to the values and concerns held by oppo-
nents.”197 And “the emerging super-statute must be sufficiently 
valuable to an important and expanding group in American so-
ciety that it generates an enthusiastic and dynamic and growing 
base of popular support.”198 Popular and ambitious laws mature 
into super-statutes via “repeated legislative refinement and re-
affirmation of the new norm or institution over a period of 
time.”199 It is only when this entrenchment has occurred that, on 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account, courts should interpret the 
statute expansively to accomplish its purposes.200  
Eskridge and Ferejohn identified the FAA as a super-stat-
ute in their tentative 2001 treatment of the subject201 but omit-
ted it from their longer 2010 monograph, and for good reason. 
 
 194. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Robert A. Katzmann, Introduction to The Yale Law Journal Online 
Symposium on Eskridge and Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes: The New Amer-
ican Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 293 (2011), https://www.yalelawjour 
nal.org/forum/introduction-to-the-yale-law-journal-online-symposium-on 
-eskridge-and-ferejohns-a-republic-of-statutes-the-new-american-constitution. 
 196. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 34, at 16–17.  
 197. Id. at 17. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 17–18. 
 200. See id. at 465 (suggesting that in the event of ambiguity, interpreters 
should consider “meta-purposes suggested by small ‘c’ constitutional goals and 
norms”); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 89, at 1249 (“For super-statutes, 
which are to be construed liberally and purposively, interpreters should apply 
words broadly and evolutively . . . .”). 
 201. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 89, at 1261–63. 
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Recent historical research has shown that while the FAA 
emerged from a lengthy lobbying campaign, it was also classic 
interest-group legislation, enacted to address turn-of-the-cen-
tury merchants’ difficulties in using arbitration to resolve time-
sensitive disputes.202 The statute’s opponents have decidedly not 
been brought into the fold as the Court has expanded the scope 
of arbitration to retrench statutes enforced through private civil 
litigation,203 nor, as detailed above, have courts uniformly em-
braced agencies’ efforts to reconcile the FAA with regulatory re-
gimes they administer.204 And while the modern FAA enjoys 
strong support of interest groups that oppose regulation of the 
private sector, the FAA decidedly lacks a dynamic and growing 
base of popular support.205 Nor has Congress embarked on a pro-
gram of refining and reaffirming the FAA: where it has acted, 
Congress has worked at the margins, trimming or expanding the 
availability of arbitration in particular domains as part of sub-
stantive regulatory overhauls or in response to interest group 
pressure.206 Congress’s most significant intervention in recent 
decades—the repeal of the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau’s arbitration rule—passed by a razor-thin margin and de-
pended on the Congressional Review Act to overcome the veto-
gates that ordinarily slow the progress of procedural legisla-
tion.207 
It might be argued that the “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements” shows that the FAA should exercise the 
 
 202. See SZALAI, supra note 49, at 34–51, 184 (describing how early arbitra-
tion reform bills that evolved into the FAA emerged from the New York Cham-
ber of Commerce’s arbitration committee, formed initially in response to the 
failings of the New York courts revealed by the 1907 Bankers’ Panic and re-
counting the celebration held at Mr. and Mrs. Vincent Astor’s Fifth Avenue 
mansion upon the FAA’s enactment); see also STASZAK, supra note 72, at 53 (not-
ing that the FAA was supported by “leaders from regional chambers of com-
merce and leading members of the ABA”). 
 203. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Just Demolished Labor 
Rights, SLATE (May 21, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/neil 
-gorsuch-demolished-labor-rights-in-epic-systems-v-lewis.html (describing the 
Epic Systems decision as “a frontal attack on the New Deal” that “effectively 
legalizes wage theft”). 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
 205. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 
“Privatization of the Justice System”, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1. 
 206. See infra Appendix A. 
 207. Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017); see David L. Noll, The Dan-
gerous Consequences of Repealing the CFPB’s Arbitration Rule, REG. REV. 
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/06/noll-repealing 
-arbitration-rule. 
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gravitational pull exercised by super-statutes.208 But that judi-
cially recognized policy is an interpretation of the FAA alone. As 
the Court reasoned in Moses H. Cone, “Section 2 is a congres-
sional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements.”209 It does not purport to describe the FAA’s rela-
tionship to other laws. 
There, of course, remains the fact that “the Supreme Court 
has construed the FAA broadly, with a breadth sweeping well 
beyond the statute’s plain meaning and the probable expecta-
tions of its framers in 1925.”210 But this is not evidence that the 
FAA occupies a privileged position in federal law under an ac-
cepted theory of statutory interpretation. It is, rather, evidence 
that the Court has interpreted the FAA dynamically and aggres-
sively, to address perceived problems with civil litigation in U.S. 
courts. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretive creativity in cases such as 
Southland, Mitsubishi, and Concepcion may be evidence of the 
general approach it is likely to take toward future arbitration 
conflicts, assuming that its membership remains stable and that 
its arbitration jurisprudence is not disrupted by legal or political 
shocks. But the Court’s past creativity is neither a reliable nor 
normatively attractive guide to the FAA’s relationship to other 
laws. The Court’s arbitration decisions have been characterized 
by shifting coalitions of Justices and a peculiar combination of 
statutory literalism and Burger-Court purposivism.211 Although 
the current majority has solidified around an anti-class-action 
reading of the FAA, there is reason to think that majority will 
not hold in the long term.212  
 
 208. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
 209. Id. But see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 481 (1989) (noting the Court’s “current strong endorsement of the federal 
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas did not cite any statutes other than the 
FAA that favor resolving legal disputes through arbitration. 
 210. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 89, at 1260. 
 211. See generally Moses, supra note 49, at 122–54 (analyzing the Court’s 
arbitration cases). 
 212. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632–33 (2018) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (following Justice Thomas’s Concepcion concurrence); AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (ad-
vancing an idiosyncratic interpretation of the FAA that preempts laws regulat-
ing arbitral collective action waivers while rejecting the majority’s reliance on 
“purposes-and-objectives pre-emption”); Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Jus-
tices Dubioius About Enforcing Arbitration Agreements for Transportation 
Workers, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/ 
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More fundamentally, that the Court in past cases “has aban-
doned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with re-
spect to the Federal Arbitration Act” is not a license for it to con-
tinue to do so in the future.213 Decisions interpreting the FAA to 
allow arbitration of statutory claims, preempt state law, and im-
munize procedural choices from judicial second-guessing over-
sight do not answer the questions of statutory interpretation pre-
sented by conflicts between the FAA and substantive regulatory 
statutes. To answer those questions, the Court will be required 
to reconcile the FAA with other statutes that bear on the enforce-
ability of agreements to arbitrate. The expansive, textually-un-
constrained mood of the Court’s past decisions is no reason for it 
to avoid deciding those cases on the merits, using traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation. 
In short, there is no legitimate reason for concluding that 
the FAA occupies a special place in federal law. The statute says 
nothing to indicate that it takes precedence over other laws, the 
Court’s arbitrability cases deal with a different problem, and the 
FAA lacks the defining characteristics of a super-statute. In-
stead, as McMahon recognized, the FAA’s rules of dispute reso-
lution procedure function “[l]ike any statutory directive.”214 
III.  THE EFFECT OF OTHER LAWS   
The prior Part demonstrated that the FAA establishes de-
fault rules governing the status of arbitration agreements and 
that the FAA does not enjoy a special place in federal law. Once 
these points are recognized, the question is when another statute 
modifies the FAA. 
Under ordinary interpretive principles, that question de-
pends on the text, structure, and purpose of statutes that bear 
 
argument-analysis-justices-dubious-about-enforcing-arbitration-agreements 
-for-transportation-workers/ (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice 
Gorsuch’s defection from the “pro-arbitration” position in Oliveira v. New 
Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018)). See 
generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(rejecting practice of “invalidat[ing] state laws based on perceived conflicts with 
broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of con-
gressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law” on the 
ground that it is unconstitutional). 
 213. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pre-
tense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”). 
 214. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
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on the use of arbitration in particular domains and on those stat-
utes’ functional relationship to the FAA.215 In particular, a stat-
ute that is more specific than the FAA—or that was enacted after 
the FAA and conflicts irreconcilably with it—supersedes the 
FAA under the specific-over-general and last-in-time canons.216 
Those principles show that the FAA is not only modified by 
statutes that expressly address the status of arbitration in par-
ticular domains—a point that is widely accepted in the doctrine 
and scholarship—but also is impliedly modified by a wide range 
of federal laws. There is, however, an important category of stat-
utes that do not modify the FAA’s default rules. In contrast to 
most scholarship that has considered the question, this Article 
shows that statutes that merely charge an agency with adminis-
tering a statute in general terms—the subject of the Supreme 
Court’s Chevron decision—do not modify the FAA. 
This Part describes the statutes that expressly and im-
pliedly modify the FAA. Part IV then turns to Chevron and ex-
plains why it is irrelevant to agencies’ authority to regulate ar-
bitration. 
A. EXPRESS QUALIFICATIONS 
1. Statutes Expressly Addressing the Validity, Enforceability, 
or Revocability of Agreements to Arbitrate 
The statutes that most obviously modify the FAA are those 
that expressly address the validity, enforceability, or revocabil-
ity of agreements to arbitrate. For example, the Patent Act 
amendments noted above provide that, while parties may agree 
to arbitrate patent infringement claims, an arbitration award re-
solving infringement claims is not enforceable until it is deliv-
ered to the Patent and Trademark Office.217 
 
 215. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1621–32 (relying on these guides 
to statutory meaning to analyze the NLRA’s relationship to the FAA); POM 
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2237–42 (2014) (same; Lan-
ham Act and Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act). 
 216. See infra notes 218–20. 
 217. See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012). Similarly, the Food, Conservation, and En-
ergy Act of 2008 provides that “[a]ny livestock or poultry contract that contains 
a provision requiring the use of arbitration to resolve any controversy that may 
arise under the contract shall contain a provision that allows a producer or 
grower, prior to entering the contract to decline to be bound by the arbitration 
provision.” 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a) (2012). And the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act provides: 
“No residential mortgage loan . . . may include terms which require arbitration 
or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy 
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“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the spe-
cific governs the general.”218 And when laws enacted at different 
times irreconcilably conflict, the later law controls.219 
Under these principles, statutes such as the Patent Act take 
precedence over the FAA. These statutes conflict with the FAA 
insofar as they require a result other than enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements according to their terms. But they generally 
were enacted after the FAA. And they are more specific than the 
FAA, both in terms of their literal language and the problem that 
they address. Thus, the statutes control where they apply.220 
2. Statutes that Delegate Authority to Regulate Arbitration to 
an Administrative Agency 
Only slightly more complicated than statutes that expressly 
address the validity, revocability, or enforceability of specific 
agreements to arbitrate are statutes that delegate authority to 
an administrative agency or executive department to regulate 
the use of arbitration. For instance, Section 1028(b) of the Dodd-
Frank Act provides that the CFPB, “by regulation, may prohibit 
or impose conditions or limitations” on consumer financial com-
panies’ use of arbitration if the bureau finds doing so “is in the 
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”221 Dodd-
Frank Section 921 similarly authorizes the Securities Exchange 
Commission to regulate the use of arbitration by securities bro-
kers and dealers.222 
 
or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) 
(2012). 
 218. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); see also 
SCALIA &  GARNER, supra note 179, at 183 (explaining that the general/specific 
canon recognizes that “the specific provision comes closer to addressing the very 
problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving of credence” and 
that “the particular provision is established upon a nearer and more exact view 
of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction.” 
(quoting 3 Jeremy Bentham, A Complete Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JER-
EMY BENTHAM 210 (John Bowring ed., 1843))). 
 219. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981). 
 220. See, e.g., Oldham v. O.K. Farms, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1320 (E.D. 
Okla. 2016) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that was invalid under 
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008); Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. 
West, 785 S.E.2d. 634, 641 n.14 (W. Va. 2016) (noting that as a result of the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of arbitration agreements in mortgage loan con-
tracts, “mandatory arbitration clauses can no longer be included in residential 
home loans”). 
 221. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012). 
 222. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (2012) (“The Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or 
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These statutes post-date the FAA and are more specific than 
it. Thus, they qualify the FAA for the same reasons that statutes 
that expressly address the enforceability of specific arbitration 
agreements do so.223 Compared to statutes that directly address 
the status of arbitration agreements, they differ only in that they 
delegate regulatory authority to an administrative agency or de-
partment instead of legislating directly. That is a common design 
choice in modern regulatory legislation, whose constitutionality 
has been accepted since the late New Deal.224 
Critics have argued that statutes which allow an agency to 
regulate the use of arbitration violate the non-delegation doc-
trine because they authorize an institution other than Congress 
to amend the FAA.225 But that argument misunderstands what 
statutes such as Section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act do. That 
section authorizes the CFPB to regulate uses of arbitration that 
 
impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require custom-
ers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate 
any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the 
rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization 
if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in 
the public interest and for the protection of investors.”). Under the Securities 
Exchange Act, “[t]he term ‘broker’ means any person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(4)(A). A “‘dealer’ means any person engaged in the business of buying 
and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or oth-
erwise.” Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A). 
 223. See supra notes 218–20. 
 224. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (“The Constitution 
as a continuously operative charter of government does not demand the impos-
sible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every 
fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself 
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the applica-
tion of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for 
Congress itself properly to investigate.”); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HAL-
LORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO 
POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 115–16 (1999) (surveying statutes 
that delegate regulatory authority to executive branch institutions in the post-
World War II era). 
 225. See John Villa & Ryan Scarborough, The Law of Unintended Conse-
quences: How the CFPB’s Unprecedented Legislative Authority and Enforcement 
Approach Has Invited Increasing Challenges, 35 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 22, 
26 (2016) (suggesting that Congress “abdicated” its constitutional responsibili-
ties in delegating authority to regulate arbitration to the CFPB). See generally 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (summariz-
ing modern non-delegation doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (cataloguing ways in which non-delegation con-
cerns influence statutory interpretation and judicial review of agency actions). 
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are generally allowed under the FAA.226 Such a statute no more 
amends the FAA than one authorizing an agency to regulate 
anti-competitive trade practices amends the provision of the 
Coinage Act providing that U.S. currency is legal tender for all 
debts, public and private.227 In both cases, a cross-cutting statute 
establishes general rules of play for the market. A more specific, 
later-enacted statute qualifies parties’ freedom of action by au-
thorizing an agency to regulate forms of contracting that, in Con-
gress’s view, create risks that require regulation. Regulation 
that operates in this manner is not a problem of constitutional 
dimensions, but the stuff of ordinary administrative law. 
3. The Relevance of Statutes that Expressly Modify the FAA 
Although statutes that expressly qualify the FAA do not pre-
sent difficult interpretive issues, critics of agency arbitration 
regulation invoke them to argue that if Congress wishes to re-
strict parties’ freedom to arbitrate or authorize an agency to reg-
ulate arbitration, it “knows how to override the FAA.”228 Like the 
argument that the FAA functions as a super-statute, this argu-
ment seeks to narrow or eliminate the circumstances in which 
other laws bear on agreements to arbitrate, again through a rule 
requiring Congress to speak clearly to displace the FAA’s de-
faults.229 
An initial problem with this argument is that it fails to ac-
count for the many statutes that impliedly modify the FAA by 
establishing rules governing primary conduct.230 As discussed 
below, scores of statutes limit parties’ freedom to arbitrate on 
terms of their own choosing by establishing substantive rights 
 
 226. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may pro-
hibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement . . . provid-
ing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 227. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012) (“United States coins and currency 
(including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks 
and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and 
dues.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (authorizing the FTC to prevent parties doing 
business in interstate commerce “from using unfair methods of competition”). 
 228. Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 7, 9, 
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“[A] federal statute 
will not be interpreted to forbid arbitration of claims within its ambit unless it 
does so expressly . . . .”). 
 229. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at 9, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285). 
 230. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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that must be respected in arbitration. The most persuasive ex-
planation is that those statutes impliedly modify the FAA’s re-
quirement that agreements to arbitrate be enforced according to 
their terms.231 
The more fundamental problem with the argument is that 
it places a burden on Congress that makes no sense when the 
development of federal arbitration law is viewed in historical 
context.232 For most of the twentieth century, there was no rea-
son for Congress to expressly address how new regulatory legis-
lation modified the FAA. It was not until the mid-1980s that the 
Supreme Court reinterpreted the FAA to allow arbitration of fed-
eral statutory claims that arose out of actions in the United 
States,233 not until the 1990s that the Court accepted arbitration 
agreements contained in boilerplate attached to standard form 
contracts of adhesion,234 and not until the past decade that the 
Supreme Court delineated the extent of contract drafters’ control 
over the procedures used in arbitration.235 Understandably fail-
 
 231. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 178 
(2008) (holding that when interpreting a statute, a federal court “must take into 
account its contemporary legal context” (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979))). 
 233. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 
(1985). 
 234. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) 
(enforcing an arbitration clause in “a standard form franchise agreement for the 
operation of a Subway sandwich shop in Montana”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. 
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (enforcing arbitration clause contained in 
“a lifetime ‘Termite Protection Plan’”). The Supreme Court did not explicitly ac-
cept the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standard form consumer con-
tracts until AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). Rely-
ing on the Seventh Circuit’s deeply controversial decision in Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court 
proclaimed “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than 
adhesive are long past.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47. 
 235. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2013) 
(concluding that an arbitration agreement’s effects on plaintiffs’ ability to assert 
a claim for violation of the Sherman Act were not a defense to its enforcement); 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343 (FAA preempts “state-law rules that stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (“[A] party may not be com-
pelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual 
basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”). But cf. Oxford Health 
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 572–73 (2013) (recognizing an arbitrator’s 
authority to conduct class proceedings where agreement that is silent on class 
arbitration gives arbitrator all the powers of a court). 
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ing to anticipate that parties could require arbitration of statu-
tory claims and agree to arbitrate through standard form boiler-
plate, lawmakers were content for most of the twentieth century 
to legislate substantive rights and policies. It was only after the 
revolution in the Court’s FAA jurisprudence—a shift in the back-
ground rules of dispute resolution procedure that originated in 
the Supreme Court, not Congress—that Congress began to ad-
dress arbitration expressly in statutes such as the Dodd-Frank 
Act.236 
B. IMPLIED QUALIFICATIONS 
Because of the dynamic just described, the majority of stat-
utes that modify the FAA will not do so expressly, but impliedly. 
Precisely when a statute impliedly qualifies the FAA is con-
tested. As Part I noted, some courts have concluded that a sub-
stantive regulatory statute allows an administrative agency to 
regulate uses of arbitration that negatively impact the statute, 
while other courts deny that regulatory statutes have this ef-
fect.237 Legal uncertainty over the circumstances in which sub-
stantive regulatory statutes qualify the FAA is a focal point in 
cases such as Epic Systems as well as in battles over the Trump 
administration’s efforts to deregulate arbitration.238 
Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, 
this section demonstrates that a federal statute impliedly quali-
fies the FAA in four circumstances: (1) when the statute estab-
lishes rules governing parties’ primary conduct; (2) when the 
statute establishes specific procedures or remedies for statutory 
claims; (3) when the statute authorizes an administrative agency 
to police regulated parties’ contracting to prevent a harm that 
Congress determined warrants regulation; and (4) when the 
statute charges an agency with implementing a specific statu-
tory policy that is affected by the use of arbitration. 
In each of these circumstances, ordinary interpretive princi-
ples show that the substantive regulatory statute modifies the 
FAA’s default rules of dispute procedure. In the third and fourth 
scenarios, agency regulation limiting the use of arbitration 
 
 236. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (observing that statutes which expressly address the use of arbitra-
tion were “enacted during the time this Court’s decisions increasingly alerted 
Congress that it would be wise to leave not the slightest room for doubt if it 
wants to secure access to a judicial forum or to provide a green light for group 
litigation before an arbitrator or court”). 
 237. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; supra note 212. 
  
714 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:665 
 
draws its authority from statutes that qualify the FAA’s de-
faults. 
1. Statutes Governing Primary Conduct 
The first situation where a statute impliedly qualifies the 
FAA is when it lays down rules governing primary conduct such 
as Title VII’s prohibition of discriminatory employment prac-
tices.239 An agreement to arbitrate might purport to bar parties 
from asserting claims for violations of those rules.240 Alterna-
tively, the arbitration agreement itself might violate the con-
duct-regulating rule—say, by instructing the arbitrator to dis-
criminate against women.241 And a party seeking to compel 
arbitration might contend that the agreement is valid and en-
forceable by reason of FAA Section 2.242 
It is a mainstay of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurispru-
dence, however, that substantive statutory rights survive the 
switch from litigation to arbitration.243 In Mitsubishi, the Court 
reasoned that “a party does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute” by agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims; 
it “only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”244 In so holding, Mitsubishi approached arbitra-
tion as if it were merely another court, one that follows the tra-
ditional choice-of-law principle that a court may apply its own 
procedures in cases governed by another sovereign’s substantive 
law.245 
Why do substantive rights survive the switch from litigation 
to arbitration? One might argue that following the applicable 
 
 239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (providing that it is “an unlawful em-
ployment practice” for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
 240. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(describing arbitration rules that required employees to follow notice proce-
dures that were not required by law). 
 241. Cf. EEOC v. Doherty Enters., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 
2015) (discussing the EEOC’s position that an employer’s use of arbitration 
formed part of a broader pattern of employment discrimination). 
 242. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 243. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013). 
 244. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985). 
 245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977) (“A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how 
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another 
state to resolve other issues in the case.”). 
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substantive law is simply inherent in what arbitration is.246 This 
argument posits that when Congress provided in the FAA that 
an arbitration agreement shall be “valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable,” it adopted a quasi-judicial model of arbitration and 
impliedly instructed arbitrators to follow the law.247 
But the suggestion that Congress adopted this understand-
ing of arbitration in the FAA does not stand up to scrutiny. A 
central historical rationale for arbitration was to allow parties to 
resolve disputes without observing legal “formalities.”248 And ar-
bitration could only perform this function if the arbitrator were 
free to resolve disputes according to extra-legal standards.249 De-
cisions from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus 
described arbitrators operating essentially free of law: “Arbitra-
tors are a law unto themselves and may decide according to their 
views of justice.”250 In her study of the nineteenth century ori-
gins of mandatory securities arbitration, Professor Jill Gross 
 
 246. See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a 
Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 45 (1999) (noting that modern 
arbitration procedures increasingly follow a “judicialized model,” which resem-
bles litigation); Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitra-
tion, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459 (1996) (“[L]itigation and securities arbitration 
have become mirror images of one another.”); Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Un-
bound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1433, 1438–39 (1996) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s acceptance of securities arbitration procedures as 
“sufficiently capable” of protecting statutory rights). 
 247. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); cf. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. 
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (“In the absence of contrary indication, we 
assume that when a statute uses such a term, Congress intended it to have its 
established meaning.”). 
 248. See Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Ar-
bitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 602 (1934); cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitra-
tors Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 137, 151 (2011) (“[N]ineteenth century arbitration served two distinct pur-
poses—to provide courts with adjuncts and to allow parties to make their own 
arrangements for resolving disputes. Because the former purpose brought arbi-
trators into closer union with judges, arbitrator rulings were subject to review 
for legal errors. In contrast, common law arbitrations were treated as inventions 
of the disputing parties. Therefore, courts only reviewed these awards for gross 
procedural defects, such as arbitrator corruption.”). 
 249. Phillips, supra note 250, at 602. 
 250. Mayberry v. Mayberry, 28 S.E. 349, 349 (N.C. 1897); cf. Underhill v. 
Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 339, 361 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (“If every award must be 
made conformable to what would have been the judgment of this Court in the 
case, it would render arbitrations useless and vexatious, and a source of great 
litigation; for it very rarely happens that both parties are satisfied.”). Julius 
Cohen adopted a similar view testifying in favor of the FAA: “[T]he right of free-
dom of contract, which the Constitution guarantees to men, includes the right 
to dispose of any controversy which may arise out of the contract in their own 
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concluded that the New York Stock Exchange required members 
to arbitrate customer disputes “to ensure that industry norms 
would be enforced, even if those norms were unlawful and not 
enforceable in court, and secondarily to provide a rapid resolu-
tion of a dispute whose value changed quickly as the stock mar-
ket rose or fell.”251 Viewed against the backdrop of this historical 
usage, the 1925 FAA cannot plausibly be read as adopting a 
quasi-judicial model of arbitration.252 “Arbitration,” as known in 
the early twentieth century, did not necessarily entail fidelity to 
law. 
Even if the FAA does not adopt a judicial model of arbitra-
tion, one could argue that every arbitration agreement contains 
an implied term directing the arbitrator to follow the applicable 
substantive law.253 On this view, the arbitrator applies relevant 
substantive law not because doing so is inherent in the nature of 
arbitration, but because the parties have directed the arbitrator 
to do so. But this argument is also ahistorical.254 And it does not 
explain why arbitrators must respect substantive rights even 
when the arbitration agreement directs them to resolve disputes 
according to a nonlegal standard, as Mitsubishi contemplated 
and many courts have held.255 
 
fashion.” Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, supra note 51, at 18 
(testimony of Julius Cohen). 
 251. Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor 
Protection Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 176 (2016). 
 252. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitra-
tion Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926) (“[Arbitration] is not the proper method 
for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions 
or policy in the application of statutes. . . . It is not a proper remedy for what we 
may call casual questions—questions with which the arbitrators have no par-
ticular experience and which are better left to the determination of skilled 
judges with a background of legal experience and established systems of law.”). 
As noted, Cohen is considered an architect of the FAA. See supra note 56. 
 253. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 626 (1985) (“[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dis-
pute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”). 
 254. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 255. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and 
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s 
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little 
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”); see also, e.g., 
Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330, 335–36 (4th Cir. 2017) (refusing 
to enforce arbitration agreement that required claims against payday lender to 
be resolved using tribal law because agreement effectively waived federal Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO 
Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to enforce arbitration 
clause that waived party’s “statutorily-mandated right to recover reasonable at-
torney’s fees” under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act). 
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Instead of reflecting the nature of arbitration or terms of the 
parties’ agreement, the fact that federal statutory rights survive 
the switch from litigation to arbitration reflects the operation of 
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Under those 
principles, a statute that addresses a specific problem such as 
the prevalence of job discrimination takes precedence over a 
cross-cutting statute that deals in general terms with the proce-
dures used to resolve legal disputes.256 The last-in-time principle 
leads to the same conclusion.257 If an agreement to arbitrate di-
rects the arbitrator to discriminate against women, the FAA and 
Title VII command irreconcilably conflicting results.258 Because 
Title VII postdates the FAA, Title VII controls.259 
The fact that laws governing primary conduct qualify the 
FAA explains why the debate between the Justices in Epic Sys-
tems focused on the meaning of the right to engage in concerted 
activity under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA rather than 
that right’s relationship to the FAA.260 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion 
for the Court reasoned that because the right to engage in con-
certed activities “appears at the end of a detailed list of activi-
ties” dealing with union organizing and collective bargaining in 
Section 7 of the NLRA, that right stops at the courthouse door.261 
Like the activities that precede it, the right to engage in con-
certed activities “serve[s] to protect things employees ‘just do’ for 
 
 256. See supra note 218. 
 257. See supra text accompanying note 216. 
 258. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 259. The fact that federal conduct-regulating statutes qualify the FAA does 
not explain why those statutes apply in international arbitrations that are not 
governed by the FAA, or why state substantive rights survive the switch from 
litigation to arbitration. See supra text accompanying note 81; supra note 164 
and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 246–48. With respect to 
the former question, Mitsubishi suggested, somewhat implausibly, that ex post 
review at the award-confirmation stage would ensure that international arbi-
trators applied federal regulatory statutes in transnational disputes. See 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, 
the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of 
the antitrust laws has been addressed.”). Perhaps the best explanation for the 
applicability of state substantive rights in arbitration is that, under traditional 
federalism principles, a clearer congressional statement than those that appear 
in the FAA would be necessary for the FAA to override state substantive rights. 
See generally Morris v. Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
principles of federalism “militate against” the Court’s jurisdiction over contract 
actions because they “are traditionally reserved for states to resolve”). 
 260. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 261. Id. at 1625. 
  
718 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:665 
 
themselves in the course of exercising their right to free associa-
tion in the workplace, rather than ‘the highly regulated, court-
room-bound ‘activities’ of class and joint litigation.’”262 Dissent-
ing, Justice Ginsburg countered that a coercive “waiver” of the 
right to engage in forms of aggregate dispute resolution that are 
permitted by generally applicable law is the precise type of ex-
ploitative agreement that Norris-LaGuardia and the NLRA aim 
to prevent.263 Those acts reflect Congress’s concern that “the in-
dividual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise 
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor.”264 
Following seventy-five years of judicial and administrative prec-
edent, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the NLRA prevents em-
ployers from interfering with employees’ right to “pursue joint, 
collective, and class suits related to the terms and conditions of 
their employment” through individual employment agreements 
that purport to deny employees the power to function as a collec-
tive.265 
On the merits, Justice Ginsburg has the better of the debate 
over the meaning of the right to engage in concerted activities.266 
But for present purposes, the important point involves that 
right’s relationship to the FAA’s rules of dispute resolution pro-
cedure. If the NLRA in fact guaranteed a right to engage in col-
lective dispute resolution to the extent permitted by generally 
applicable procedural rules, as Justice Ginsburg contended, that 
 
 262. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Alternative Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 414–15 
(6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 263. Id. at 1635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 264. Id. at 1635 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)). 
 265. Id. at 1637. 
 266. As Justice Ginsburg observed, an individual employment agreement 
that waives the right to engage in collective dispute resolution via an undertak-
ing to arbitrate disputes on an individual basis is strikingly similar to the yel-
low-dog contracts that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA § 7 were enacted 
to address. Id. See generally Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal 
Reform, 1917–1932, 30 LAB. HIST. 251, 270–74 (1989). Those statutes refer to 
“concerted activity” in general terms rather than specifically addressing dispute 
resolution procedure because Congress could not have anticipated all the ways 
that employers might interfere with employees’ concerted activity. Id. Indeed, 
it was not until the early 2000s that the legal foundations for barring collective 
action via arbitration were established. See David L. Noll, With Arbitration 
Case, SCOTUS Can Protect Both Federal Law, Workers’ Rights, HILL (Oct. 7, 
2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/354386-with-arbitration-case-scotus 
-can-protect-both-federal-law-workers-rights (so arguing). 
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right would take precedence over the FAA, as even Justice Gor-
such concedes.267 It is only because the NLRA confers no such 
right that the Epic Systems Court concluded employees’ obliga-
tion to arbitrate is controlled by the FAA alone.268 
Of course, an agency that seeks to regulate the use of arbi-
tration on the ground that it violates a statutory right must have 
authority to enforce the right that the agency regulation vindi-
cates.269 If, say, the NLRB asserted authority to regulate uses of 
arbitration that violate the antitrust laws, its action would be 
invalid because the NLRB is not charged with enforcing the an-
titrust laws.270 And agency arbitration regulation must comply 
with generally applicable administrative law requirements such 
as being supported by substantial evidence and reflecting a rea-
soned exercise of the agency’s delegated authority.271 If these re-
quirements are satisfied, agency regulation based on the 
agency’s conclusion that arbitration violates a substantive right 
it enforces is a valid exercise of the agency’s authority under a 
substantive regulatory statute. 
2. Litigation-Structuring Statutes 
The same principles that explain why conduct-regulating 
rules apply in arbitration explain why statutes governing the 
dispute-resolution process—such as those governing the burden 
 
 267. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (“Congress has instructed that arbitration 
agreements like those before us must be enforced as written. While Congress is 
of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing suggesting it did 
so in the NLRA—much less that it manifested a clear intention to displace the 
Arbitration Act.”). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (directing reviewing courts to “hold un-
lawful and set aside agency action . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, author-
ity, or limitations, or short of statutory right”). 
 270. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 
(2002) (NLRB may not order relief for actions made illegal by statutes it does 
not administer). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (providing that the 
Board is “empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair 
labor practice . . . affecting commerce”). 
 271. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (directing reviewing courts to set aside agency 
action “unsupported by substantial evidence”); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (establishing the principle that, when 
reviewing agency action, the court must consider “whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 
(1951) (defining substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla. It means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion”). 
  
720 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:665 
 
of proof,272 remedies,273 and attorneys’ fee-shifting274—do so as 
well. Compared to conduct-regulating laws, it is more difficult to 
explain these statutes’ applicability in arbitration on the ground 
that they create substantive rights that apply in any forum 
where a litigant seeks to vindicate her legal rights.275 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has stated—and lower courts have ex-
pressly held—that they apply in arbitration.276 
The reason is that these statutes are more specific than the 
FAA’s cross-cutting command that agreements to arbitrate are 
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable. For instance, the Civil Rights 
Attorneys’ Fees Act provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding 
to enforce [specified civil rights laws], the court, in its discretion, 
 
 272. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”). 
 273. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (providing that a prevailing plaintiff 
in an action to enforce the antitrust laws “shall recover threefold the damages 
by it sustained, and the cost of suit”). 
 274. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce 
[specified civil rights laws] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the 
costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held 
liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in 
excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.”). 
 275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). But see, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indust., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
492 U.S. 257, 277–80 (1989) (concluding that a state-law cap on damages is 
“substantive” for purposes of the Erie doctrine and the Rules of Decision Act); 
Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (same; state-law statute of limi-
tations). 
 276. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) 
(“In enacting such measures [as the Sherman Act’s treble damages provision], 
Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the nor-
mal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful 
trade practice.”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(holding that an arbitration agreement may not waive the right to treble dam-
ages and attorney’s fees under federal antitrust laws); Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. 
Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that where arbitration agreement 
modifies parties’ responsibility to pay for attorney’s fees, “final responsibility for 
attorney’s fees should be governed by the appropriate statute”); Armendariz v. 
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000) (“The principle 
that an arbitration agreement may not limit statutorily imposed remedies such 
as punitive damages and attorney fees appears to be undisputed.”). But cf. Car-
bajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2004) (stat-
ing in dictum that “no general doctrine of federal law prevents people from waiv-
ing statutory rights (whether substantive or procedural) in exchange for other 
things they value more, such as lower prices or reduced disputation”). 
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may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”277 Similarly, the 
Sherman Act provides that a prevailing plaintiff “shall recover 
threefold the damages by it sustained, and the cost of suit.”278 
While the statutes’ reference to the “court” might be read as a 
signal that they do not apply in arbitration, their obvious intent 
is to establish statutory remedies that apply in any action seek-
ing to impose civil liability.279 
This contrasts with procedural laws that do not apply in ar-
bitration, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules 
provide that they “govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts,”280 and they are 
promulgated under a statute which gives the U.S. Supreme 
Court “the power to prescribe general rules of practice and pro-
cedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States dis-
trict courts . . . and courts of appeals.”281 Explicitly limited to the 
district courts, the rules do not establish procedures that apply 
in any proceeding where a litigant seeks to impose civil liability. 
3. Statutes that Subject Regulated Parties’ Contracting to 
Agency Oversight 
A third category of statutes that impliedly qualify the FAA 
are those that authorize an agency or department to police reg-
ulated parties’ contracting. For example, amendments to the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 authorize the Education Depart-
ment to promulgate language that schools participating in the 
federal direct loan program must incorporate into their student 
agreements “to protect the interests of the United States and to 
promote the purposes of [the direct loan program].”282 Prior to 
the change of administrations, the DOE invoked this authority 
to prohibit schools from mandating arbitration of predatory lend-
ing claims and using other contract provisions that had contrib-
uted to the collapse of several for-profit colleges.283 Similarly, 
 
 277. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 278. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
 279. Cf. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 100–01 (2012) (rea-
soning that statutory disclosure provisions referring to an “action,” “class ac-
tion,” and “court” reflected Congress’s intent that regulated parties be subject 
to civil liability for statutory violations). 
 280. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 281. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). 
 282. 20 U.S.C. § 1087d(a)(6) (2012). 
 283. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1, 
2016) (final rule). The rule responded to Corinthian Colleges’ successful use of 
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1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act give the Secu-
rities Exchange Commission (SEC) authority to oversee rules of 
securities self-regulatory organizations.284 Acting under this au-
thority, the SEC has long regulated mandatory arbitration in the 
securities industry.285 
Like statutes that create substantive rights or address the 
structure of dispute resolution, these statutes were enacted to 
address specific problems. For instance, the Higher Education 
Amendments seek to protect the public fisc and to ensure that 
money spent via direct loans is only used for bona fide educa-
tional expenses.286 And the statutes generally post-date the 
FAA. Thus, they qualify the FAA for the same reasons that stat-
utes which create substantive statutory rights or statutory pro-
cedures do so.287 They are more specific than the FAA because 
they address the problem that is more particularized than com-
mon law courts’ general hostility to arbitration. And to the ex-
tent that they irreconcilably conflict with the FAA, they take 
precedence because they were enacted later in time. 
 
arbitration clauses to obtain the dismissal of proposed class actions alleging 
that it had engaged in predatory lending. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Corinthian 
Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013); Montgomery v. Corinthian Coll., No. 
11–C–365, 2011 WL 1118942, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2011). The Department 
concluded that Corinthian’s arbitration requirements, with other contractual 
liability protections, effectively immunized it from liability for predatory lend-
ing. 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,926. 
 284. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78s(b)(2)(C)) (2012) (“The Commission shall approve a proposed rule change 
of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such proposed rule change is 
consistent with the requirements of this chapter and the rules and regulations 
issued under this chapter that are applicable to such organization.”). 
 285. Rule 12,200 of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which took 
effect following SEC approval, generally requires broker-dealers and their cus-
tomers to arbitrate all disputes, subject to a carve-out for securities class actions 
that are filed in court. FINRA CODE, RULE 12,200 (2008), http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607& 
record_id=609 (requiring arbitration of all disputes); FINRA CODE, RULE 12,204 
(2008) http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403& 
element_Id=4906&record_id=5174&filtered_tag= (class action carve-out); 
Gross, supra note 92, at 512 (“Since virtually all broker-dealers are members of 
FINRA, ‘no broker-dealer can escape the self-regulatory system.’” (quoting NOR-
MAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION 
§ 4.01[C] (4th ed. 2007))). 
 286. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,933 (ob-
serving that the 2016 Borrower Defense Rule sought to further DOE’s statutory 
mandate to “protect student loan borrowers while also protecting the Federal 
and taxpayer interests”). 
 287. See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text. 
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Opponents of agency arbitration regulation contend that 
statutes which subject regulated parties’ contracting to agency 
oversight do not allow an agency to regulate arbitration, because 
the statutes do not specifically mention arbitration and the deci-
sion to regulate arbitration conflicts with the liberal federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration.288 But these arguments ignore the logic 
of statutory provisions that grant agencies authority to police 
regulated parties’ contracting. The point of these provisions is to 
circumscribe parties’ freedom of contract because Congress 
judged that their actions give rise to a problem that warrants 
regulation.289 On the basis of that congressional judgment, the 
statutes prototypically give an agency general authority over 
regulated parties’ contracting. That power not only includes au-
thority to restrict regulated parties’ choices regarding dispute 
resolution, but also choices concerning price, conditions of per-
formance, remedies, warranties, and other matters. It makes no 
sense to insist that Congress spell out agencies’ authority to re-
strict the use of arbitration in so many terms, because this would 
defeat Congress’s judgment that regulated parties’ contracting 
should be subject to a second look to ensure that it does not cre-
ate the harms Congress sought to prevent. 
The test of the validity of arbitration regulation promul-
gated under a statute that authorizes an agency to police regu-
lated parties’ contracting, then, is simply whether the agency ad-
hered to the terms of the substantive statute it acted under and 
followed generally applicable administrative-law requirements. 
For instance, the DOE has authority under the Higher Educa-
 
 288. Complaint at ¶¶ 100–12, California Ass’n of Private Postsecondary Sch. 
v. DeVos, No. 1:17-cv-00999, 2018 WL 5017749 (D.D.C. May 24, 2017) (No. 17-
999). On the “freedom of contract” protected by the FAA, see Kindred Nursing 
Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017) (“By its terms . . . the Act 
cares not only about the ‘enforce[ment]’ of arbitration agreements, but also 
about their initial ‘valid[ity]’—that is, about what it takes to enter into them.”); 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
476 (1989) (“There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set 
of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, ac-
cording to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”). 
 289. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(d)(a)(2) (2012) (providing that a participation 
agreement between DOE and a college seeking to enroll in the direct loan pro-
gram shall “provide assurances that the institution will comply with require-
ments established by the Secretary relating to student loan information with 
respect to loans made under this part”). See generally 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 86–90 (1971) (not-
ing that regulation is often a “negative process” wherein agencies “react” to the 
initiatives of companies and private parties). 
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tion Act to prescribe contractual provisions that it deems neces-
sary to promote the purposes of the direct loan program and pro-
tect the interests of the United States.290 The 2016 Borrower De-
fense Rule unquestionably satisfies that standard.291 Following 
the collapse of Corinthian Colleges, DOE studied the conditions 
that contributed to Corinthian’s collapse and concluded that con-
tractual restrictions on private civil litigation allowed the school 
to engage in predatory lending for longer than otherwise would 
have been possible.292 The Borrower Defense rule operates 
within the space that the Higher Education Amendments carve 
out from the FAA’s default procedural regime. 
4. Statutes that Delegate Authority to an Agency to 
Promulgate Subsidiary Administrative Policy 
The final category of statutes that impliedly qualify the FAA 
are those that charge an agency with implementing subsidiary 
administrative policy under a regulatory statute.293 For exam-
ple, the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 directs CMS to prom-
ulgate regulations governing nursing homes that receive money 
from Medicare and Medicaid, and “to assure that requirements 
which govern the provision of care in skilled nursing facilities 
. . . are adequate to protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights 
of residents.”294 Other statutes delegate policymaking authority 
to an agency by authorizing the agency to grant exemptions or 
waivers from generally applicable regulatory requirements. For 
 
 290. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 292. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926, 75,933 
(Nov. 1, 2016) (“Since the collapse of Corinthian, the Department has received 
a flood of borrower defense claims stemming from the school’s misconduct. In 
order to streamline and strengthen this process, we believe it is critical that the 
Department proceed now in accordance with its statutory authority, as dele-
gated by Congress, to finalize regulations that protect student loan borrowers 
while also protecting the Federal and taxpayer interests.”). 
 293. This term originates in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) 
(“It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn 
from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call 
for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administra-
tive policy within the prescribed statutory framework.”). 
 294. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(f ) (1), 1396r(f ) (1) (2012). The Act additionally pro-
vides that nursing homes must “protect and promote” eleven enumerated rights, 
including rights “established by the [HHS] Secretary.” Id. §§ 1395i-3(c)(1)(A) 
(xi), 1396r (c)(1)(A)(xi). 
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instance, ERISA authorizes the Labor Department to grant in-
dividual or classwide exemptions from the fiduciary obligations 
that the statute imposes on investment advisors.295 
By now, it should be obvious why statutes that authorize an 
agency to promulgate subsidiary administrative policy qualify 
the FAA. Those statutes reflect Congress’s judgment that a prob-
lem warrants regulation through federal legislation.296 Rather 
than set regulatory standards directly—a task that may be im-
possible or politically unattractive for lawmakers—Congress 
delegates.297 When the agency reasonably concludes that the use 
of arbitration should be limited or prohibited because arbitration 
negatively impacts the agency’s statutory mandate, it acts under 
a statute that impliedly modifies the FAA.298 
That a statute authorizes an agency to prescribe subsidiary 
administrative policy by waiving statutory requirements does 
not change the conclusion that the statute impliedly modifies the 
FAA. Like an affirmative grant of regulatory authority, a grant 
of waiver authority reflects Congress’s judgment that a problem 
in a particular area warrants regulation. Waiver authority dif-
fers from a grant of affirmative regulatory authority only in the 
baseline that the agency operates against. Instead of (or in addi-
tion to) authorizing the agency to establish affirmative stand-
ards, the statute authorizes the agency to establish conditions in 
which those requirements are waived.299 
 
 295. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (2012). 
 296. See Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Reform: A His-
torical Account of the Recent Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-
Term Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 
ELDER L.J. 267, 268 (1999) (describing the problems that Congress sought to 
address in the Act). 
 297. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424 (“The Constitution . . . does not require that 
Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action 
or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be 
prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and 
circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.”). On the 
considerations that inform Congress’s choice to delegate or directly establish 
regulatory standards by law, see EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 224, at 1–
10. 
 298. See Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 209 (N.D. 
Tex. 2017) (concluding that arbitration restrictions in the DOL fiduciary rule 
“fit[ ]  within the DOL’s authority to grant ‘conditional or unconditional’ exemp-
tions [under ERISA], and do not violate the FAA”). 
 299. On the policy logic of statutes that grant agencies waiver authority, see 
David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 265 (2013); Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Edu-
cation Federalism, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (2015). 
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Perhaps the most common objection to the conclusion that 
statutes such as the Nursing Home Reform Act qualify the FAA 
is that those statutes are no more or less specific than the 
FAA.300 Regulating arbitration under a substantive regulatory 
statute is thus said to involve a paradox of specificity. The sub-
stantive statute is more specific than the FAA with respect to 
uses of arbitration that impact its objectives (e.g., ensuring the 
health and safety of nursing home residents). But the FAA is 
more specific than the substantive statute with respect to dis-
pute resolution procedure. 
When reconciling overlapping statutes, however, courts do 
not look exclusively to the language used in conflicting statutes 
but also to the breadth or specificity of the problem that moti-
vated Congress to legislate.301 A leading case illustrating this 
principle is Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.302 At issue was the 
relationship between Section 94 of the National Bank Act, which 
provides that “a national bank may be sued only in the district 
in which it is established,”303 and Section 27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which provides that an action to enforce 
the Act “may be brought in any . . . district [where the violation 
occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is 
an inhabitant or transacts business.”304 In securities fraud suits 
against national banks, the two statutes gave rise to a paradox 
of specificity similar to the one in disputes over agency arbitra-
tion regulation. The Bank Act is more specific about the venue 
 
 300. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 1039 (“The FAA . . . is likely to be the 
earlier statute but also more general than subject-area-specific statutes that 
might be read to limit it. . . . That the specific controls the general does not end 
the matter, however. After all, one might object that the FAA is actually the 
more specific statute in that it mentions arbitration whereas the statute being 
invoked by the agency (by hypothesis) does not.”); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018) (“[T]he question before us is whether courts 
must enforce particular arbitration agreements according to their terms. And 
it’s the Arbitration Act that speaks directly to the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements, while the NLRA doesn’t mention arbitration at all. So if forced to 
choose between the two, we might well say the Arbitration Act offers the more 
on-point instruction.” (dictum)). 
 301. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 
(2000) (“In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the ques-
tion at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particu-
lar statutory provision in isolation. . . . [T]he meaning of one statute may be 
affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently 
and more specifically to the topic at hand.” (citing United States v. Estate of 
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–31 (1998))). 
 302. 426 U.S. 148 (1976). 
 303. Id. 
 304. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012). 
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for suits against banks, while the Exchange Act is more specific 
about the venue for securities-fraud claims.305 Neither statute 
addresses its effect on the other. 
Confronted with this paradox, the Supreme Court held that 
the Bank Act’s venue provision controlled. The Court observed 
that— 
When Congress enacted the narrow venue provisions of the National 
Bank Act, it was focusing on the particularized problems of national 
banks that might be sued in the state or federal courts. When, 70 years 
later, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, its focus was on 
the objective of promoting fair dealing in the securities markets, and it 
enacted a general venue provision applicable to the broad universe of 
potential defendants subject to the prohibitions of that Act.306 
Because the problem Congress addressed in the National Bank 
Act was more “particularized” than the one it addressed in the 
Securities Act, the Bank Act controlled. 
Analyzed this way, the paradox presented by agency arbi-
tration regulation under a provision that charges an agency with 
promulgating subsidiary administrative policy evaporates. The 
FAA and the pertinent substantive statute may be equally spe-
cific at a linguistic level. But the substantive statute almost al-
ways deals with a “particularized problem[]” that is more spe-
cific than the problem that motivated the FAA.307 For instance, 
Congress adopted the Nursing Home Reform Act “amidst stories 
of unnecessary death and suffering in nursing homes” to “reform 
the nursing home industry, improve the quality of nursing home 
care, and protect the residents of long-term care facilities.”308 
That objective is more particularized than the FAA’s general ob-
jective of overriding the judicial hostility to arbitration reflected 
in the common law non-enforceability and revocability doc-
trines.309 
Of course, an arbitration regulation promulgated under a 
statutory provision that directs the agency to promulgate sub-
sidiary administrative policy can be challenged on the ground 
that arbitration does not actually have effects that implicate the 
agency’s statutory mandate. Thus in American Health Care 
Ass’n v. Burwell, a Mississippi district court concluded that CMS 
had not compiled an adequate administrative record to support 
its view that mandatory arbitration threatened nursing home 
 
 305. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 152. 
 306. Id. at 153–54 (emphasis added). 
 307. Id. at 154. 
 308. Grassley, supra note 296, at 268. 
 309. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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residents’ health and safety.310 Regulation under a statute that 
charges an agency with elaborating subsidiary administrative 
policy can also be challenged on the ground that the agency did 
not comply with requirements such as considering material, non-
frivolous comments and giving a reasoned analysis of its regula-
tory approach.311 
But again, this is the stuff of ordinary administrative law. 
Agency arbitration regulation under a statute that charges the 
agency with implementing subsidiary administrative policy may 
or may not satisfy standard administrative-law requirements. 
Because the statute the agency acts under impliedly qualifies 
the FAA, the regulation does not fail for lack of statutory author-
ity. 
*** 
In sum, ordinary principles of statutory interpretation show 
that the FAA’s background rules of statutory interpretation are 
qualified by a range of federal statutes. Of course, there remains 
the possibility of genuine conflicts between the FAA and other 
laws, when principles of statutory interpretation do not answer 
whether the FAA or the other law prevails.312 But in many sce-
narios relevant to agency arbitration, another statute expressly 
or impliedly qualifies the FAA’s defaults. In addition to laws that 
expressly address arbitration, the FAA is qualified by laws gov-
erning primary conduct, laws that establish specific procedures 
and remedies for statutory claims, laws that charge an adminis-
trative agency with policing regulated parties’ contracting, and 
laws that direct an administrative agency to promulgate subsid-
iary statutory policy. Between them, these statutes provide au-
thority for a substantial swath of agency arbitration regulation. 
 
 310. 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 939 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (“[T]his court believes that 
CMS would be required to actually prove that this negative impact is occurring, 
with proof considerably more reliable than comments received from the pub-
lic.”). The finding that CMS had failed to prove that arbitration harmed nursing 
home residents was striking in light of the district court’s separate conclusions 
that arbitration serves as a tool for “pure delay” in nursing home litigation, and 
that the Long-Term Care Rule was “based upon sound public policy.” Id. at 928, 
946. 
 311. See Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 336, 345 (D.C. Cir. 
2017); Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 312. See Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 884 F.3d 382, 391 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(concluding that a discharge injunction entered under § 524 of the Bankruptcy 
Code barred enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration clause that related to core 
bankruptcy proceedings, because enforcing the clause conflicted with bank-
ruptcy’s fresh start policy). 
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IV.  LAWS THAT DO NOT QUALIFY THE FAA: CHEVRON 
AND AGENCY ARBITRATION REGULATION   
As the preceding Parts of this Article demonstrate, the FAA 
establishes default rules of dispute resolution procedure that ap-
ply unless it is modified by another law. Those defaults are mod-
ified by a range of statutes that expressly or impliedly modify 
the FAA and provide authority for many of the agency arbitra-
tion regulations that have been issued over the past decade. 
There is, however, an important category of statutes that do not 
qualify the FAA. These are the type of statutes addressed by the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc.313 
This Part completes this Article’s theory of the FAA’s rela-
tionship to other federal laws by explaining why what one might 
call “Chevron statutes” do not modify the FAA. Sections A and B 
review Chevron and explain why its holding that an agency may 
speak with the force of law depends on the circumstances the 
Supreme Court confronted in Chevron, in which an agency acts 
under a single statute that it is charged with administering. Sec-
tion C then explains why a Chevron-type statute, standing alone, 
does not qualify the background rules established by the FAA, 
and thus does not provide authority for an agency charged with 
administering the statute to regulate arbitration in ways that 
conflict with the FAA. 
A. THE CHEVRON DECISION 
The backdrop to Chevron is familiar but worth repeating to 
clarify exactly what the Court there decided. In the decades fol-
lowing World War II, Congress enacted a large number of stat-
utes that to a significant extent define the modern federal regu-
latory state.314 The statutes prototypically created an 
administrative agency and charged it with implementing policy 
under a statute, or charged an existing agency or department 
with doing so.315 But lawmakers often neglected to specify which 
 
 313. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 314. For histories of Congress’s activity in the post-War era, see generally 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Part IV (3d 
ed. 2005); JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRA-
TIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL (2014); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regula-
tion in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1272–94 (1986); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 
2078–82 (1990). 
 315. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 
§ 101, 61 Stat. 136, 146 (carrying forward the NLRA provision providing that 
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institution—the courts or the implementing agency (or agencies) 
charged with administering a statute—was authorized to inter-
pret statutory gaps and ambiguities.316 Both courts and admin-
istrative agencies claimed the authority to interpret indetermi-
nate statutory provisions—courts because “say[ing] what the 
law is” is an archetypal judicial function, and agencies, because 
administering a statute requires the agency to interpret it and 
many agency interpretations will never be reviewed in court.317 
Prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court’s doctrine on the status of 
agency statutory interpretation was inconsistent and contradic-
tory.318 
At issue in Chevron were 1977 amendments to the Clean Air 
Act that directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
administer a new licensing program for states that had failed to 
bring air pollution within limits required by the 1970 Clean Air 
Act.319 The amended Clean Air Act directed EPA to perform a 
long list of tasks and authorized the EPA administrator “to pre-
scribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his func-
tions” under the statute.320 But the statute did not specify EPA’s 
authority to interpret the statutory term “major stationary 
 
the Board “is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from 
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce”) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 
§ 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012)) (“Each Federal 
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assis-
tance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the 
provisions of Section 601 [prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or 
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the 
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with 
which the action is taken.”); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 
§ 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)) (“The Administrator 
shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with 
the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air 
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle 
engines, which in his judgment causes or contributes to, or is likely to cause or 
to contribute to, air pollution which endangers the public health or welfare.”). 
 316. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1 
155–57 (5th ed. 2010). 
 317. See Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1983) (arguing “[i]t is in light of agency competence to 
make law that the ‘duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’ must 
be evaluated”). 
 318. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 316, at 155. 
 319. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 85). 
 320. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1). 
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source[] .”321 That mattered because if every piece of pollution-
producing equipment (e.g., each smokestack) were considered a 
“source,” EPA could not authorize states to treat power plants 
and factories as a single source of pollution—an idea known as 
the “bubble concept.”322 Regulatory reformers favored the bubble 
concept because it encouraged firms to find cost-effective ways of 
reducing pollution; environmentalists opposed the bubble con-
cept because it allowed firms to put off adopting state-of-the-art 
pollution control technology.323 
Chevron famously held that when Congress enacts a statute 
such as the 1977 Clean Air Amendments, it impliedly delegates 
authority to the implementing agency to interpret the statute 
provided that the agency interpretation is reasonable.324 Justice 
John Paul Stevens’s opinion for the Court began by noting that 
Congress might “explicitly [leave] a gap for the agency to fill,” 
which evidenced “an express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regula-
tion.”325 Here, the agency’s “legislative regulations are given con-
trolling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute.”326 Congress, however, might also 
delegate authority to the agency via an “implicit rather than ex-
plicit” delegation by enacting indeterminate language or leaving 
a “gap” in a statute that it “charged [an agency] with responsi-
bility for administering.”327 Here, the agency’s “reasonable” in-
terpretation is controlling.328 
The theoretical rationale for this holding is the subject of 
considerable debate.329 To briefly summarize, the “intentional-
ist” reading of Chevron posits that most questions about how an 
 
 321. Id. § 129(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5)). 
 322. See Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 
(1984). 
 323. See Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and Ad-
ministrative Discretion, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 171, 179–81 (Richard 
J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). 
 324. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 325. Id. at 843–44. 
 326. Id. at 844. This is the standard of review prescribed by § 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 327. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 328. Id. at 866. 
 329. E.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doc-
trine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Ques-
tions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986); Ronald J. Kroto-
szynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the 
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002); Antonin Scalia, 
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agency-administered statute is “interpreted” are actually ques-
tions of subsidiary statutory policy.330 As between the courts and 
an agency charged with administering a statute, the agency is 
better positioned to make policy under the statute because of its 
expertise and accountability to democratic politics via the presi-
dent.331 Congress knows or should be presumed to know that 
agencies are better policymakers than courts. Courts therefore 
read indeterminate statutory provisions as delegating interpre-
tive authority to the agency. 
By contrast, the “structural” reading of Chevron posits that 
a statutory ambiguity or gap creates space for the agency to ex-
ercise its background authority to make regulatory policy 
through rulemaking or agency adjudication.332 The agency’s in-
terpretation is controlling because Congress generally author-
ized the agency to make policy under the statute, and the agency 
regulation works in the interstices of the specific provisions Con-
gress enacted. 
Whatever its theoretical rationale, the conclusion that inde-
terminate statutory language impliedly delegates regulatory au-
thority to the agency charged with implementing a statute 
yielded Chevron’s familiar two-step process for judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretation. “First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”333 If Congress has not addressed that issue, “the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.”334 
 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
273 (2011); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them 
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 
115 YALE L.J. 2580 (2006); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 131; see also Evan 
J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2008) (“Chevron 
does not rest exclusively upon any of these competing rationales. Instead, Chev-
ron forges a pragmatic consensus between several leading theories, none of 
which can be properly considered redundant.”). 
 330. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 329. 
 331. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 329, at 370; Scalia, supra note 329, at 517; 
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 131, at 925–27. 
 332. See, e.g., ESTREICHER & NOLL, supra note 147, at 590–91; Strauss, su-
pra note 329, at 1145. 
 333. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 334. Id. at 843. 
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B. CHEVRON’S LIMITS 
Although Chevron clarified that Congress may delegate in-
terpretive authority to an agency by enacting indeterminate lan-
guage, many statutes fall outside of its scope.335 In United States 
v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court clarified that a statute only 
delegates interpretive authority to an agency if “the agency’s 
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances 
[reveal] that Congress would expect the agency to be able to 
speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the 
statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”336 Mead focused on 
the procedures that Congress authorized an agency to use in 
promulgating administrative policy. While declining to lay down 
a bright-line rule, the Court intimated that a statute must au-
thorize the agency to engage in rulemaking or adjudication to 
impliedly delegate interpretive authority to the agency.337 
Another “statutory circumstance” that affects the agency’s 
authority to speak with the force of law is the place of the agency-
administered statute in broader body of federal law. As Profes-
sors Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman observe in a leading 
article on “Chevron’s domain,” Chevron addresses scenarios in 
which “a single agency is responsible for developing and enforc-
ing policy under a statute.”338 It is in this context, Chevron holds, 
that indeterminate statutory language delegates interpretive 
authority to the administering agency. 
On either the intentionalist or structural reading of Chev-
ron, the single-statute single-agency structure is crucial to Chev-
ron’s applicability. Consider a statute that multiple agencies ad-
minister.339 On the intentionalist reading, all of the agencies 
charged with administering the statute have an interpretive 
edge over the courts. That Congress opted for agency administra-
 
 335. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 187 (2006). 
 336. 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 337. Id. at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation mer-
iting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in 
the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings 
for which deference is claimed.”). 
 338. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 335, at 893. 
 339. See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883–84 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing phenomenon of “statutes that parcel out 
authority to multiple agencies, which ‘may be the norm, rather than an excep-
tion’” (quoting Jacob Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 208 (2006))). 
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tion does not answer which of these agencies’ views should con-
trol. The structural reading of Chevron points to the same con-
clusion. While indeterminate language creates space in which an 
agency can exercise its background authority to make regulatory 
policy, multiple agencies have background lawmaking authority. 
And the mere fact that Congress has left space for the exercise 
of that background authority does not indicate which agency’s 
view should control.340 
Based on this reasoning, courts have not accorded control-
ling weight to an agency interpretation when more than one 
agency administers a statute,341 and where an agency seeks def-
erence for its interpretation of a government-wide statute that 
is not administered by that agency alone.342 Under this line of 
precedent, no agency speaks with the force of law when it inter-
prets the FAA as opposed to a statute the agency administers. 
This conclusion follows from the basic problem Chevron ad-
dresses: how interpretive authority is allocated between the 
courts and a single agency that is “charged with the administra-
tion of the statute in light of everyday realities.”343 
C. CHEVRON-TYPE STATUTES AS AUTHORITY FOR AGENCY 
ARBITRATION REGULATION 
Although the statutes described in sections A and B provide 
authority for much agency arbitration regulation, executive 
branch actors have also relied on Chevron-type statutes as au-
thority to regulate arbitration in ways that conflict with the 
FAA. For example, President Obama’s Fair Pay and Safe Work-
places Executive Order344 directed federal contracting officers to 
 
 340. See id. at 1884 (“When presented with an agency’s interpretation of 
such a statute, a court cannot simply ask whether the statute is one that the 
agency administers.”). 
 341. See, e.g., Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, 514 F.3d 1328, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855, 863 
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Rapaport v. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 215–17 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). But see 1185 Ave. of Americas Assocs. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 22 F.3d 
494, 497 (2d Cir. 1994) (affording less than “full deference” to an agency’s inter-
pretation of a statute administered by multiple agencies). 
 342. See, e.g., AT&T, Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d on 
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 66 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 343. Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984). 
 344. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 79 Fed. Reg. 150 (July 31, 2014), amended by 
Exec. Order No. 13,683, 79 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 16, 2014), repealed Pub. L. No. 
115-111, 131 Stat. 2273; see Federal Acquisition Circular 2005–90, 81 Fed. Reg. 
  
2018] ARBITRATION CONFLICTS 735 
 
ensure that certain federal contractors did not require their em-
ployees to arbitrate claims for sexual harassment and assault, 
as is generally allowed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.345 Challengers contended that the 
order was precluded by the FAA.346 The Department of Justice 
responded that the Fair Pay Order was a valid exercise of the 
president’s authority under the Procurement Act of 1949, which 
authorizes the president in general terms to prescribe policies 
and directives to “provide the Federal Government with an eco-
nomical and efficient system” for purchasing goods and ser-
vices.347 
The Procurement Act does not authorize the president to 
regulate arbitration in so many words, nor does it authorize the 
president to police regulated parties’ contracting or direct the 
president to implement a specific statutory policy that arbitra-
tion negatively impacts. Instead, the Act addresses a problem 
(the need for a federal procurement system) which is at least as 
broad as the one addressed by the FAA (the hostility to arbitra-
tion reflected in the common law revocability and unenforceabil-
ity doctrines). DOJ’s position was that the Procurement Act’s 
Chevron-style delegation—its general direction to administer a 
statutory program—authorized the president to displace the 
FAA’s background rules of dispute resolution procedure.348 
But there is a crucial difference between the statutory cir-
cumstances Chevron addresses and those implicated by an arbi-
tration regulation such as the Fair Pay order. Whereas Chevron 
addresses a single agency’s interpretation of a single statute it 
administers, the Fair Pay order implicates two statutes—the 
 
165 (Aug. 25, 2016) (specifying contractual language that contracting agencies 
must use to comply with the Order). 
 345. 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) (holding that FAA § 1’s “employment” excep-
tion applies only to employees “actually engaged in the movement of goods in 
interstate commerce”). 
 346. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 
WL 8188655, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016). 
 347. 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121(a) (2012) (“The President may prescribe policies 
and directives that the President considers necessary to carry out this subti-
tle.”). 
 348. Defs.’ Opp. to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temp. Restraining Order and Pre-
liminary Injunction, Associated Builders & Contractors v. Rung, No. 1:16-cv-
00425-MAC, 2016 WL 8292054 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016) (No.16-cv-00425) (“As 
courts . . . have recognized, the Procurement Act authority is broad.” (citing 
AFL-CIA v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Procurement Act gives 
the president “direct and broad-ranging authority”))). 
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Procurement Act and the FAA. And those two statutes give con-
flicting signals about the extent of the delegate’s authority over 
arbitration. As in the typical Chevron context, the statute the 
president administers supports his authority to regulate. But 
the FAA tugs in the opposite direction. 
This difference undermines the inference that Congress im-
pliedly delegated authority to the president to speak with the 
force of law concerning arbitration in the Procurement Act. On 
the intentionalist reading of Chevron, the executive’s relative ad-
vantages as a policymaker vis-à-vis the courts do not support the 
inference that Congress intended the White House to make sub-
sidiary statutory policy that carries the force of law, because one 
of the statutes that bears on the Fair Pay Order’s validity—the 
FAA—does not invite any institution apart from the courts to 
make subsidiary statutory policy. Nor do the statutes relevant 
to the Fair Pay order show that the agency has authority to reg-
ulate arbitration. The Procurement Act certainly delegates reg-
ulatory authority to the president. But as it is no more specific 
than the FAA, it does not create space in which the president 
may make subsidiary policy. The FAA fills the field. 
The conclusion that a Chevron-type statute such as the Pro-
curement Act does not allow agencies to regulate arbitration is 
at odds with much scholarly writing on the question.349 In argu-
ing otherwise, scholars generally rely on the following syllogism: 
(1) a substantive regulatory statute’s effect on the FAA is often 
ambiguous; (2) Chevron teaches that an agency’s reasonable in-
 
 349. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 31, at 1035 (arguing “that, as a general 
matter, agencies should have authority to reasonably interpret their statutes in 
order to regulate arbitration” under Chevron); Deference and the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, supra note 31, at 908 (arguing that Chevron deference is “warranted 
for the [National Labor Relations] Board’s finding that the NLRA provides em-
ployees with a substantive statutory right to pursue legal claims collectively, 
which would render the arbitration agreements waiving that right unenforcea-
ble under the FAA”); Fisk, supra note 31, at 181 (same); Lloyd, supra note 31, 
at 25 (arguing that FTC regulations restricting the use of arbitration under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are entitled to Chevron deference and take prec-
edence over the FAA). But cf. Rebecca Hanner White, Arbitration and the Ad-
ministrative State, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1283 (2003) (arguing that arbitra-
tors are bound by agency statutory interpretations that are binding under 
Chevron, but not considering the extent of agencies’ authority to regulate arbi-
tration under substantive regulatory statutes); Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Pro-
cess in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 428, 431 (2012) (suggesting that while “several formidable 
arguments against deference deserve mention . . . portions of the NLRB ruling 
and FINRA Rules . . . remain eligible for Chevron deference”). 
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terpretation of a statute it administers is authoritative; there-
fore (3) if the agency charged with implementing a statute rea-
sonably concludes that the statute modifies the FAA, the statute 
in fact modifies the FAA. 
For instance, an important recent contribution to the debate 
over agency arbitration regulation contends that “[w]hether 
there is a contrary congressional command [qualifying the FAA] 
. . . is a question, essentially, of the meaning of the non-FAA stat-
ute being invoked.”350 Because Chevron holds that “Congress in-
tends the agency and not the courts to be the principal interpret-
ers of [indeterminate] legislation,” an implementing agency’s 
reasonable view of “whether that statute ‘evince[s] an intention 
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights 
at issue’” is authoritative.351 “Congress has chosen the agency 
and not the court as the body to resolve the ambiguity. And such 
a delegation [includes], by its nature, the power to disrupt back-
ground legal rules within prescribed bounds.”352 On this view, an 
agency-administered statute standing alone may or may not 
qualify the FAA’s background rules of dispute resolution proce-
dure. But once the statute’s meaning is established through a 
procedurally-proper agency interpretation, the statute may 
qualify the FAA. 
This argument, however, depends on the agency’s interpre-
tation qualifying for Chevron treatment. And for reasons just ex-
plained, the usual inference that indeterminate statutory lan-
guage signals that Congress intended to delegate interpretive 
authority to the implementing agency does not hold when an 
agency invokes a Chevron-type statute to regulate arbitration. If 
the agency’s interpretation does not qualify for Chevron treat-
ment, there is no basis for holding that an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute it administers is controlling—and no basis for 
saying that statute modifies the FAA. 
It follows that the district court’s decision in Associated 
Builders and Contractors of Southeast Texas enjoining the Fair 
Pay and Safe Workplace Order’s arbitration rules for lack of stat-
utory authority was correct.353 The court there held that those 
rules were not based on a “congressional command that would 
 
 350. Deacon, supra note 31, at 1036. 
 351. Id. at 1036–37 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
 352. Id. at 1039. 
 353. Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 
2016 WL 8188655, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016). 
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override the requirement that arbitration agreements be en-
forced in accordance with their terms.”354 Although the court’s 
order contains language suggesting that the FAA may only be 
modified by legislation that expressly addresses arbitration355—
a proposition that Part III(b) showed is incorrect—the conclusion 
that the Procurement Act does not modify the FAA’s background 
rules of dispute resolution procedure correctly understands the 
relationship between the two statutes. The president’s policies 
implementing the Procurement Act may well carry the force of 
law on an ordinary Chevron analysis. But the Act’s sweeping del-
egation of authority to the president to run the federal procure-
ment system does not qualify the FAA’s defaults. 
  CONCLUSION   
Regulation of arbitration by federal administrative agencies 
is a flashpoint in larger conflicts over the U.S. civil justice sys-
tem. In an effort to address the costs of procedural and regula-
tory balkanization and blunt the impact of entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs’ litigation, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of 
arbitration under the FAA, eliminating constraints that limited 
arbitration’s impacts on federal regulatory policy for most of the 
twentieth century. As the use of arbitration increased, agencies 
charged with administering substantive regulatory statutes in-
voked those statutes to regulate the use of arbitration within 
their areas of authority. But agencies’ efforts to limit arbitra-
tion’s policy impacts have been plagued by persistent questions 
about agencies’ statutory authority. Those questions took on new 
importance following the 2016 election, as opponents of agency 
arbitration regulation—some now operating from within the 
agencies they previously attacked—invoked agencies’ supposed 
lack of authority to regulate arbitration as a justification for roll-
ing back Obama-era arbitration regulations. 
This Article offers a general theory of the legal question at 
the heart of disputes over agency arbitration regulation: how the 
FAA relates to other federal laws. The Article shows that the 
FAA functions as a statutory floor whose rules of dispute resolu-
tion procedure apply unless and until it is qualified by another 
law. Statutes that expressly qualify the FAA include those that 
specifically address the validity, revocability, and enforceability 
of arbitration agreements and those that delegate authority to 
 
 354. Id. at *14. 
 355. See id. (“Congress may choose to modify one statute with another 
and . . . it knows how to limit arbitration policies when it so desires.”). 
  
2018] ARBITRATION CONFLICTS 739 
 
regulate arbitration to an administrative agency. Statutes that 
impliedly qualify the FAA include those that establish statutory 
rights and remedies, as the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence 
recognizes. But they also include statutes that authorize an 
agency to police regulated parties’ contracting, and laws that 
charge an agency with implementing subsidiary administrative 
policy. Conspicuously absent from the list of statutes that qualify 
the FAA are Chevron-type statutes that charge an agency with 
administering a statutory scheme without directing the agency 
to implement a specific statutory policy. Although Chevron holds 
that such a statute delegates regulatory authority to the imple-
menting agency, the statutory circumstances that this holding is 
based on are missing in the context of agency arbitration regu-
lation. 
The Article’s theory has immediate implications for judicial 
review of the Trump administration’s efforts to rollback Obama-
era arbitration regulations, many of which are premised on the 
incorrect conclusion that the regulating agency lacks authority 
to regulate the use of arbitration under a substantive grant of 
regulatory authority. But the Article’s theory is relevant beyond 
the current deregulatory moment. The FAA is less exceptional 
than supporters and critics of the Supreme Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence both tend to assume. Understanding this point is 
essential for evaluating conflicts such as Epic Systems. And it 
sheds light on the extent of agencies’ authority to regulate arbi-
tration when and if control of the executive branch returns to a 
pro-regulatory administration. 
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  APPENDIX A   
POST-2007 ARBITRATION STATUTES356 
 
Title Summary 
Food, Conservation, and Energy 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–234 
§ 11004, 122 Stat. 923 (2008) 
Allows covered poultry farmers to 
opt out of arbitration agreements 
with poultry processors 
American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 
§ 1553, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) 
Prohibits pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate whistleblower claims under 
Act 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 531(b)(1), 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Preempts state law restrictions on 
insurers’ power to resolve disputes 
pursuant to contractual arbitration 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 748, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Prohibits pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate commodities industry whis-
tleblower claims 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 921, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Authorizes Securities Exchange 
Commission to regulate broker/deal-
ers’ use of arbitration 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 922, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Prohibits agreements requiring arbi-
tration of securities whistleblower 
claims 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 1028, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Authorizes Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau to regulate consumer 
financial companies’ use of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements 
 
 356. This table aims to gather all federal statutes that address the validity, 
enforceability, or revocability of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate that were 
enacted between January 1, 2007, and May 1, 2018. The table excludes statutes 
providing for arbitration under the auspices of a court or agency, statutes that 
address arbitration of labor disputes, and those that provide for arbitration of 
claims involving the United States under an international agreement. The table 
was generated by searching ProQuest’s database of public laws for statutes that 
mention the terms “arbitration” or “arbitrate” and reviewing the data manually 
to exclude false positives. 
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 1057(d), 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Prohibits pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate consumer finance industry 
whistleblower claims 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 § 1414, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) 
Prohibits pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in mortgage loan con-
tracts 
Department of Defense and Full-
Year Continuing Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-10 § 8102, 125 
Stat. 38 (2011) 
Prohibits covered Defense Depart-
ment contractors from requiring em-
ployees to arbitrate claims under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and claims for sexual assault and 
sexual harassment (Franken Amend-
ment) 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-74 § 8101, 125 Stat. 
786 (2012) 
Franken Amendment 
Consolidated and Further Continu-
ing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-6 § 8097, 127 Stat. 198 (2013) 
Franken Amendment 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 113-76 § 8096, 128 Stat. 
5 (2014) 
Franken Amendment 
Consolidated and Further Continu-
ing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-235 § 8101, 128 Stat. 2130 
(2014) 
Franken Amendment 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
114-113 § 8097, 129 Stat. 2242 
(2015) 
Franken Amendment 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-31 § 8096, 131 Stat. 
135 (2017) 
Franken Amendment 
Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 
(2017) 
Disapproves Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Arbitration Rule 
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Protecting Young Victims from Sex-
ual Abuse and Safe Sport Authori-
zation Act, Pub. L. No. 115-126 
§ 202, 132 Stat. 318 (2018) 
Provides that the United States Cen-
ter for Safe Sport may utilize arbi-
tration to resolve allegations of sex-
ual abuse within its jurisdiction but 
preserves victims’ right to pursue 
civil remedies through the courts for 
personal injuries 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 8095 (2018) 
Franken Amendment 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 7029 (g) 
(2018) 
Directs Secretary of Treasury to in-
struct the United States executive 
director of each international finan-
cial institution to require that insti-
tution is following best practices for 
protection of whistleblowers, includ-
ing access to external arbitration 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 7058(b) 
(2018) 
Requires Secretary of State to ensure 
that Global Fund to Fight Aids fol-
lows best practices for protection of 
whistleblowers, including access to 
external arbitration 
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  APPENDIX B   
AGENCY ARBITRATION REGULATION SINCE 2007357 
 
Agency &  
Regulation 
Date of last 
agency action 
Summary Status  
Commodities  
Futures Trading 
Commission, 
Regulation 7.201 
Aug. 6, 2009 Requires mem-
bers of Chicago 
Board of Trade 
to arbitrate cus-
tomer disputes. 
No class action 
carve-out 
In effect 
Department of 
Defense, Defense 
Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation 
Supplement;  
Extension of Re-
strictions on the 
Use of Manda-
tory Arbitration 
Agreements 
June 29, 2011 Implements 
Franken 
Amendment  
prohibitions on 
defense contrac-
tors’ use of man-
datory arbitra-
tion 
In effect 
National Labor 
Relations Board, 
D.R. Horton/Mur-
phy Oil rule 
Oct. 28, 2014 Prohibits  
individually  
negotiated em-
ployment agree-
ments that bar 
employees from 
joining together 
to assert claims 
in arbitration or 
litigation 
Invalidated by 
Supreme Court 
in Epic Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis 
 
 357. This table aims to gather all proposed or final agency actions regulating 
the use of arbitration that were announced between January 1, 2007, and May 
1, 2018. The table excludes agency regulations that address arbitration under 
the auspices of a court or agency, regulations that address arbitration of labor 
disputes, and regulations that provide for arbitration of claims involving the 
United States under an international agreement. It was compiled by searching 
the Federal Register for documents that contain the terms “arbitration” or “ar-
bitrate” and reviewing the results by hand to exclude false positives. 
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Equal Employ-
ment Oppor-
tunity Commis-
sion, case-specific 
challenges to ar-
bitration agree-
ments used as 
part of a pattern 
or practice of em-
ployment dis-
crimination 
Nov. 21, 2014 EEOC chal-
lenges manda-
tory arbitration 
agreement that 
agency contends 
was used as part 
of pattern and 
practice of em-
ployment dis-
crimination 
Last complaint 
filed Nov. 21, 
2014 
Executive Office 
of the President, 
Fair Pay and 
Safe Workplaces 
Executive Order 
Aug. 23, 2016 Directs federal 
contracting offic-
ers to ensure 
that contractors 
do not mandate 
arbitration of 
claims for sexual 
assault and har-
assment 
Repealed by 
Congress via 
Congressional  
Review Act 
Department of 
Defense, Military 
Lending Act Reg-
ulation 
Aug. 26, 2016 Prohibits cov-
ered creditors 
from mandating 
that military 
borrowers agree 
to arbitration 
In effect 
Consumer Finan-
cial Protection 
Bureau, Regula-
tion Z Amend-
ments 
Nov. 22, 2016 Implements 
Dodd-Frank Act 
provision pro-
hibiting arbitra-
tion clauses and 
waivers of statu-
tory causes of 
action for loans 
secured by a res-
idential dwelling 
In effect 
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Federal Commu-
nications Com-
mission, Broad-
band Privacy 
Regulation 
Dec. 2, 2016 Commits to ini-
tiating a rule-
making on use 
of mandatory ar-
bitration in con-
sumer contracts 
for broadband 
and other com-
munications ser-
vices 
Proposed arbi-
tration rulemak-
ing never initi-
ated. Broadband 
Privacy Regula-
tion repealed by 
Congress via 
Congressional 
Review Act 
Commodities  
Future Trading 
Commission, 
Whistleblower 
Awards Process 
May 30, 2017 Implements pro-
vision of Dodd-
Frank Act that 
prohibits arbi-
tration of whis-
tleblower claims 
under section 23 
of the Commodi-
ties Exchange 
Act 
In effect 
Center for Medi-
caid and Medi-
care Services, 
Long-Term Care 
Rule 
June 6, 2017 Prohibits nurs-
ing homes from 
including man-
datory arbitra-
tion clauses in 
admission con-
tracts 
Preliminarily 
enjoined. 
Amended rule 
proposed June 6, 
2017 
Consumer Finan-
cial Protection 
Bureau, Arbitra-
tion Rule 
July 19, 2017 
 
Prohibits use of 
arbitration 
agreements to 
block class ac-
tions filed in 
public courts. 
Requires sub-
mission of data 
on arbitral fil-
ings and out-
comes to Bureau 
Repealed by 
Congress via 
Congressional 
Review Act 
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Department of 
Education, Bor-
rower Defense 
Rule 
Oct. 24, 2017 Prohibits 
schools that par-
ticipate in fed-
eral direct loan 
program from 
mandating arbi-
tration of stu-
dents’ claims or 
making use of 
arbitral class ac-
tion waivers 
In effect pursu-
ant to judicial 
vacatur of in-
terim rule  
proposing to 
postpone 2016 
rule’s effective 
date 
Department of 
Labor, Fiduciary 
Rule 
Nov. 29, 2017 Requires retire-
ment plan advi-
sors to forego 
use of arbitral 
class action 
waivers to use 
compensation 
practices other-
wise prohibited 
by ERISA 
Effective date 
stayed pending 
agency reconsid-
eration; vacated 
by U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit 
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  APPENDIX C   
HISTORICAL AGENCY ARBITRATION REGULATION358 
 
Agency & Regulation Summary Current status 
Securities Exchange 
Commission, FINRA  
Arbitration Rules 
Carries forward New 
York Stock Exchange 
rules requiring arbi-
tration of broker 
-dealer disputes sub-
ject to class action 
carve-out 
In effect 
Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act Regula-
tions 
Prohibits arbitration 
of breach of warranty 
claims under Mag-
nuson-Moss Act 
In effect. Courts  
divided on validity 
 
 
 
 
 
 358. This table aims to gather all proposed or final agency actions regulating 
the use of arbitration that were announced before January 1, 2007. It was com-
piled through a review of the secondary literature. 
